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COMENTS
POSSESSION AND PRESUMPTIONS: THE PLIGHT OF THE PASSENGER
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution stands as the protector of the rights of all
persons, both the guilty and the innocent, and the Supreme Court stands as the
ultimate defender of those rights.' Recently, however, the Court has strayed
from its role by proclaiming new law with respect to the right of automobile
passengers to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." 2
In Rakas v. Illinois, 3 the Court held that a guest in an automobile does not
have an expectation of privacy sufficient to contest the admissibility of the fruits
of a search as evidence of the crime with which he is charged, even if that
search is unconstitutional. 4 More recently, in County Court v. Allen, 5 the Court
held constitutional statutes making presence in an automobile at the time that
contraband is discovered therein presumptive evidence of possession by all
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803); see Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (implicitly overruled in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-400 (1937)).
2. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
3. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
4. 439 U.S. at 149. In view of the Court's holding, the search is unconstitutional only as to
the driver or owner of the vehicle. As will be developed in part IH(A), the admissibility of the
evidence is premised on the idea that passengers lack an expectation of privacy in the automobile
and are therefore without fourth amendment protection; as to them, no fourth amendment
violation in the form of an unconstitutional search has occurred. A debate on the merits of the
legitimate expectation of privacy test as applied to automobile passengers is beyond the scope of
this Comment. For a discussion of the validity of the Court's holding, see Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule, Standing, and Expectation of Privacy for Car Passengers: A Confusion of
Concepts, 31 Baylor L. Rev. 227 (1979) [hereinafter cited as The Exclusionary Rule]; Note,
Standing to Raise Fourth Amendment Guarantees Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures:
Rakas v. Illinois, 15 Tulsa L.J. 85 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fourth Amendment Guarantees].
5. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). It is noteworthy that even at first glance, the Rakas and Allen
holdings are anomalous. In Rakas, the Court held that passengers have no expectation of privacy
in the automobile and therefore cannot object to the seizure of most items therein, yet in Allen the
Court held that passengers may be presumed to be in possession of certain items found in the
vehicle by the mere fact of the passengers' presence. It would seem that to possess an item is not
an act that occurs in a vacuum and it should therefore carry with it some form of privacy interest.
Property law recognizes this principle by defining possession as having dominion and control over
the object. See 0. Browder, R. Cunningham & J. Julin, Basic Property Law 22-25 (2d ed. 1973).
One who rightfully possesses holds that item to the exclusion of all other persons. Id. Language
this powerful implies a right of privacy. As the Supreme Court has noted, "one who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978).
Others, however, argue that possession as used in the criminal law is not as broad a concept and
should not be confused with possession sufficient to rise to an expectation of privacy. Trager &
Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 Brooklyn L. Rev. 421, 437-38
(1975); Brief for the United States, United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir.), cert.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244).
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occupants. In light of these decisions, it is alarming that the Court in United
States v. Salvucci 6 is presently considering the vitality of the automatic stand-
ing rule.' That rule conveys the necessary standing to contest the constitu-
tionality of a search to any person charged with a possessory crime when the
evidence of illegal possession was seized during that search.8 Although the
cases may appear to bear only a tenuous relationship to each other, the
combined effect of the three may lead to basic injustices in the area of
criminal law.
If the Court rejects automatic standing as an avenue for contesting the
legality of a search and seizure, it risks creating a legal loophole through which
police officers, in their attempt to enforce the laws, may circumvent the
restraints imposed by the fourth amendment, 9 and necessarily infringe on the
fourth amendment rights of all persons. 10 This, in turn, may lead to conviction
of the innocent. As envisioned by the dissent in Rakas, the Court has declared
"'open season"' on automobiles with several occupants.'' The potential for
abuse is heightened when presumption statutes are used as an aid to conviction,
and is further compounded by the police officer's knowledge that the possession
on which that conviction will rest will not automatically provide standing to
contest an unconstitutional search. This Comment contends that if the Court
abandons automatic standing with respect to passengers charged with posses-
sion of contraband pursuant to a presumption statute, not only will "open
season" be declared, but the "hunt" may prove unjustly successful.
I. THE DEMISE OF THE AUTOMATIC STANDING RULE
The primary purpose of the United States Constitution is to limit government
infringement of individual rights. ' 2 One striking manifestation of this aim is the
6. 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244).
7. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (created the automatic standing rule).
8. See notes 34-42 infra and accompanying text.
9. "[T]he police often do not hold the requirements of the fourth amendment itself in great
esteem-in part because . . . they are so easy to evade .... ." Kaplan, The Limits of the
Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1038 (1974). All courts have the duty of guarding
against "stealthy encroachments" on an individual's constitutional rights. Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
10. If automatic standing was eliminated, standing requirements as presently expressed
would "merely encourag[e] the police to search the homes [or automobiles] of people they believe to
be innocent, [in the hope of gaining evidence usuable against someone else] leaving the privacy of
those they believe to be guilty undisturbed." White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search
and Seizure, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 333, 348 (1970). Moreover, because many searches undoubtedly
yield no incriminating evidence, only the most flagrant abuses find redress in the courts. Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson further noted:
"There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful searches of ... automobiles of
innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which
courts do nothing, and about which we never hear. Courts can protect the innocent against such
invasions only indirectly and through the medium of excluding evidence obtained against those
who frequently are guilty. . . . So a search against [a person's car in violation of the fourth
amendment] must be regarded as a search of the car of Everyman." Id.
11. 439 U.S. 128, 157 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
12. B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law § 1.1 (2d ed. 1979); L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law § 1-2, at 1-2 (1978).
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fourth amendment, from which all persons receive the profound right of
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 13 The Supreme Court
created the exclusionary rule 4 to ensure that this language is more than an
empty promise. The rule renders inadmissible in either a federal or state
criminal prosecution any evidence seized in violation of a defendant's constitu-
tional rights.'- The exclusionary rule is perceived as a remedy that will,
13. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
Const. amend. IV. For a discussion of the historical development of the fourth amendment, see
Knox, Some Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge
Searches and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 3-14 (1975).
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Supreme Court first suggested in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), that evidence seized in contradiction of the fourth
amendment should not be admissible at trial. The Court, recognizing the inherent interrelation-
ship between the fourth and fifth amendments, reasoned that compelling an individual to deliver
private documents to the court violates his privilege against self-incrimination and is equivalent
to admitting evidence from an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 634-35. Therefore, the
Boyd Court held unconstitutional a customs law that required defendants to produce their papers
at trial. Id. at 638. Nevertheless, the Boyd decision went unnoticed for almost thirty years until it
was finally revived by the Weeks Court. 232 U.S. at 390-94.
15. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (state prosecutions); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914) (federal prosecutions). The Weeks Court held that evidence secured by federal
agents in an illegal search and seizure was barred in federal prosecutions. 232 U.S. at 398.
Subsequently, courts considered whether evidence illegally seized by state officers was admissible
in federal actions when federal agents had cooperated, but not actually participated, in the
search. E.g., Marron v. United States, 8 F.2d 251, 259 (9th Cir. 1925); Legman v. United States,
295 F. 474, 476-78 (3d Cir. 1924); Flagg v. United States, 233 F. 481, 482-83 (2d Cir. 1916);
United States v. Brown, 8 F.2d 630, 631 (D. Or. 1925), aff'd, 12 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1926); United
States v. Slusser, 270 F. 818, 820 (S.D. Ohio 1921). The Supreme Court squarely addressed that
problem in Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), holding that if the search "in substance
and effect was a joint operation of the local and federal officers," then the evidence must be
excluded. Id. at 33. Further questions and confusion arose as to the extent of participation
necessary by a federal agent in an unlawful search before the evidence was deemed inadmissible.
Compare United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897, 898-99 (10th Cir. 1946) and Ward v. United
States, 96 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1938) and Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305, 307-08
(4th Cir. 1937) and Fowler v. United States, 62 F.2d 656, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1932) with Kitt v.
United States, 132 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1942) and Sloane v. United States, 47 F.2d 889, 890
(10th Cir. 1931). This dilemma was resolved by the Supreme Court in Lustig v. United States,
338 U.S. 74 (1949). In that case, the Court held that "[it is immaterial whether a federal agent
originated the idea or joined in it while the search was in progress. So long as he was in it before
the object of the search was completely accomplished, he must be deemed to have participated in
it .... [and the evidence] secured through such federal participation is inadmissible .... " d. at
79. Lower courts also had difficulty, however, in deciding whether evidence seized by state
officers in violation of the'fourth amendment, absent any actual participation by federal agents,
could subsequently be turned over to federal agents and used in a federal prosecution. Compare
Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 173 (2d Cir. 1928) and United States v. Jankowski, 28 F.2d
800, 802 (2d Cir. 1928) with United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897, 898 (10th Cir. 1946). This
practice, known as the "silver platter" doctrine, Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. at 78-79, was
expressly declared unconstitutional in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). That
result was compelled by the Court's earlier decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949),
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through its deterrent effect, protect every person's fourth amendment rights; it
is not a constitutional right enjoyed only by the wronged individual. 1 6 As Is
suggested, the rule's central function is the discouragement of police miscon-
duct. 7 "iTlhe exclusionary rule gives every prosecuted person an opportunity
to vindicate search and seizure principles for the benefit of all, insofar as
violations of these principles have resulted in the production of evidence
against the accused."' 8
overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Wolf, the Court held that the fourth
amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures wits applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, suggesting that state officers were confined to
the strictures of the fourth amendment. 338 U.S. at 27-28. Nevertheless, the Court refused to
compel the states to adopt the exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing the dictates of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 33. The Court reasoned that the exclusionary remedy was not an "essential
ingredient of the right" to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 29. Further-
more, the Court noted that most states had not independently adopted the exclusionary rule since
the decision in Weeks. Id. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), however, the Court
overturned its decision in Wolf, finding the exclusionary rule sanction constitutionally compelled.
16. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Treating the exclusionary rule as a
remedy rather than a right is indicative of the Supreme Court's inroads into the scope of the rule.
The exclusionary rule was intended to be of constitutional dimension by its creators, Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), and by later Supreme Court enforcers. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) ("that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments is not only the logical dictate of prior cases, but it also makes very good
sense"); see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Despite these
pronouncements, the Supreme Court has recently begun to narrow the rule's scope. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (exclusionary rule held not to be basis for federal habeas corpus relief
when state has provided opportunity for full and fair challenge of alleged fourth amendment
violation); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (exclusionary rule held not to apply
retroactively); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary rule held not
applicable to grand jury proceedings); cf. California v. Minjares, 100 S. Ct. 9, 9 (1979)
(Rhenquist, J., dissenting) (called for a reexamination of the exclusionary rule and the extent to
which it should be retained).
17. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976). It has been said that the exclusionary rule "is
the most effective remedy we possess to deter police lawlessness." Paulsen, The Exclusionary
Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 255, 257 (1961); accord, B.
Schwartz, supra note 12, § 7.20, at 292; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 671 (1970); Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 5, at 453. Professor
Oaks conducted a comprehensive empirical study, Oaks, supra, at 678-709, from which he
concluded that the exclusionary rule is a viable deterrent of police misconduct. Id. at 709. Other
theories as to the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule have been forwarded. Justice Brandeis
proposed that judicial integrity is the rationale behind the exclusionary rule and therefore argued
that the government should never be permitted to avail itself of fruits of illegal searches and
seizures. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-84 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(implicitly overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967)). "If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy." Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Another theory, derived from
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), is that when evidence, seized in violation of fourth
amendment rights, is introduced at trial, there is a violation of one's fifth amendment right to be
free from compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 634-35; see Oaks, supra, at 668-72.
18. Paulsen, supra note 17, at 260. The application of the exclusionary rule is not limited to
fourth amendment violations. Evidence will be excluded when it is obtained in contravention of
any constitutional right. Specifically, evidence has been ruled inadmissible when obtained in
1030 [Vol. 48
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A criminal defendant seeking to invoke the exclusionary rule must first cross
a threshold: he must show that he has standing to contest the alleged search
and seizure.' 9 Without standing, the question whether a violation of the
fourth amendment has occurred, resulting in the implementation of the
exclusionary rule, will never be reached. Traditionally, a defendant asserting
a fourth amendment claim was required to show an invasion of his property
rights; specifically, he had to demonstrate a possessory or proprietary interest
in the premises searched or the property seized.20 More recently, the concept
of standing has undergone a metamorphosis, traceable to the landmark
decision in Katz v. United States, 2 1 in which the Supreme Court said that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."2 2 Therefore, constitu-
tional protection no longer extends to property per se, 2 3 but is limited to that
toward which an individual has manifested a reasonable and actual expecta-
tion of privacy. 24 Hence, although an individual has an admitted property
violation of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (Court excluded incriminating statements
elicited after denial of right to counsel); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263. 271-72 (1967) (Court
excluded identification made at a lineup held without defendant's counsel); Miranda v, Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (Court ruled confession inadmissible when privilege against self-
incrimination was not knowingly waived). Moreover, evidence has been excluded when the
methods used to obtain it are deemed so appalling that use of the evidence would violate due
process. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (evidence obtained as a result of
inducing vomiting against defendant's will excluded; such conduct "shocks the conscience").
19. See B. Schwartz, supra note 12, §§ 1.15, 1.17; L. Tribe, supra note 12, §§ 3-17 to -19, -25
to -27; C. Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 13 (3d ed. 1976).
20. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-90 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 261 (1960); Edwards, Standing to Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 471, 473-75 (1952); Knox, supra note 13, at 36. It has been suggested that the reason the
Supreme Court initially required an individual to show a property interest in an invaded area was
due to its belief that the words "secure in their persons," U.S. Const. amend. IV, connoted a
possessory interest in the premises searched or the property seized. Knox. supra note 13, at 36.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. Id. at 351. Fourth amendment protection should not depend simply on whether there has
been a technical trespass, id. at 353, but rather on whether the person claiming the protection
sought to preserve as private that into which the government intruded. Id. The legal significance
of privacy was earlier recognized by Warren and Brandeis. They contended that "in very early
times, the law gave a remedy only for physical interference with ... property, for trespasses
.... Later, there came a recognition of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect.
Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now.., the term 'property' has grown
to comprise every form of possession-intangible, as well as tangible." Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 193 (1890).
23. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The premise that property interests
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.").
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). A particular person
seeking the protection of the fourth amendment must satisfy a two-fold test. He must show not
only a subjective expectation of privacy, but also that the expectation was objectively reasonable.
Id. This test, formulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Kat:, was subsequently adopted
by the Supreme Court. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n. 12 (1978); id. at 151 tPowell, J.,
concurring). Of course, no individual attempting to obtain standing would admit to not having a
subjective expectation of privacy; consequently, the Court's inquiry need only focus on whether
an objective expectation of privacy exists.
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interest in his own home, those household items he leaves in plain view and
those conversations he has without an expectation of confidentiality are not
protected by the fourth amendment. 25 Conversely, a private telephone call
made from a public phone booth is protected from unreasonable and unlim-
ited government intrusion.
26
Consistent with this view, the Court subsequently proclaimed that fourth
amendment rights may not be asserted vicariously. 27 That one may not assert
the fourth amendment rights of another logically follows from the idea that
only those with a privacy interest in an invaded area have had their fourth
amendment rights violated. Moreover, the Court's distaste for vicarious
assertions of fourth amendment claims is a consequence of its apparent dislike
for the broad sweep of the exclusionary rule. 28 Granting standing so that an
individual may raise another's fourth amendment rights would necessarily
result in a more extensive use of the exclusionary rule at criminal trials. 29 The
Court has noted that the societal interest in ascertaining the truth to convict
criminals is substantially sacrificed whenever the exclusionary rule is applied
to suppress admittedly truthful and inculpating evidence.3 0 Therefore, "mis-
givings as to the benefit of enlarging the class of persons who may invoke that
rule are properly considered when deciding whether to expand standing to
assert Fourth Amendment violations."'31
On this foundation, the Court recently concluded that "the better analysis
forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoretically separate, but invariably
intertwined concept of standing. '32 The inquiry is whether the search that a
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351. The right of a police officer to seize incriminating
objects that he observes from a vantage point where he has a legal right to be is a consequence of
the plain view doctrine. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971). Therefore,
such items can be seized during a search pursuant to a warrant, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931), during a search pursuant to one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement, such as hot pursuit, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967), during a
search incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969), or when there is no
ongoing search, but a police officer inadvertently discovers incriminating evidence. Harris v.
United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam).
26. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-53.
27. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). "[lit is entirely proper to require of
one who seeks to challenge the legality of a search as the basis for suppressing relevant evidence
that he allege, and if the allegation be disputed that he establish, that he himself was the victim of
an invasion of privacy." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
28. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978). "Each time the exclusionary rule is
applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights.
Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is
deflected." Id. at 137 (citations omitted); see note 16 supra.
29. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978); cf. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371
(1951) (witness can invoke privilege against self-incrimination only to protect himself, not others).
30. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
31. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 139. Standing to raise a fourth amendment claim means simply that the govern-
ment intruded into an individual's own fourth amendment protective sphere. See id. at 140. To
view standing as a separate and distinct concept from substantive fourth amendment rights is to
confuse the issue of whether a violation occurred. The Supreme Court in Jones v. United States,
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particular criminal defendant seeks to challenge and the seizure of the evidence
he seeks to suppress violated his personal fourth amendment rights. 33 In short,
if a defendant's fourth amendment rights were violated, he has standing; if he
has standing, by definition, his fourth amendment rights were violated.
One situation in which a form of vicarious standing has thus far been
preserved is the automatic standing rule. 34 The Court adopted this rule in
Jones v. United States, 35 the first case to deal extensively with the relationship
between standing and an alleged infringement of fourth amendment rights.
The defendant had been charged with illegal possession of narcotics. The Court
recognized that to implement the then property-oriented standing test 36 would
create two dilemmas. First, the defendant would need to incriminate himself by
admitting possession of the narcotics at a suppression hearing. 37 To reap the
benefits of the fourth amendment, he would have to sacrifice the benefits of the
fifth amendment. 38 Second, the prosecution would be placed in the awkward
position of contradicting itself. At the preliminary hearing, the government
would have to assert that the defendant did not have a sufficient possessory
interest to merit standing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence; at trial,
however, it would have to argue that the defendant was in fact in possession of
the contraband so as to convict. 3 9 The Court stated that "[i]t is not consonant
with the amenities ... of the administration of criminal justice to sanction such
squarely contradictory assertions of power by the Government." 40
To alleviate the problems of the defendant's self-incrimination and the
prosecution's self-contradiction, the Jones Court developed the automatic
362 U.S. 257 (1960), exhibited discomfort in using the word standing by repeatedly bracketing it
with quotation marks. Id. at 261, 263, 265. This fact was later recognized and commented upon
by the Rakas Court as an indication of the "artificiality" of concentrating on the defendant's
standing, rather than on the extent of his rights, when analyzing whether a fourth amendment
violation has occurred. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 139.
33. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978).
34. Id. at 135 n.4 (the automatic standing rule is "one which may allow a defendant to
assert the Fourth Amendment rights of another").
35. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Prior to Jones, che cases gave the issue of standing only limited
discussion. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 34 (1925).
36. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. The Jones Court did not eliminate the prior
concept that standing may be premised solely on property right violations. See Knox, supra note
13, at 36.
37. 362 U.S. at 261-62. Judge Learned Hand eloquently described the futility inherent in the
defendant's situation: "Men may wince at admitting that they were the owners, or in possession,
of contraband property; may wish at once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the
perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they come as victims, they must take on that
role, with enough detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at bar shrank from that
predicament; but they were obliged to choose one horn of the dilemma," Connolly v. Medalie, 58
F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932).
38. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " U.S. Const. amend. V.
39. 362 U.S. at 263.
40. Id. at 263-64. To discourage prosecutorial self-contradiction is to help preserve judicial
integrity, a concern that found expression in the rationale for the exclusionary rule. See note 17
supra; notes 206-11 infra and accompanying text.
1980] 1033
1034 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
standing rule. "The same element ... which has caused a dilemma, i.e., that
possession both convicts and confers standing, eliminates any necessity for a
preliminary showing of an interest in the premises searched or the property
seized, which ordinarily is required when standing is challenged."'4 1 Once a
person is charged with a possessory crime, that fact alone allows him to contest
the constitutionality of the search that led to the seizure of the incriminating
evidence. 42 The automatic standing rule permits an individual to hide behind
41. 362 U.S. at 263.
42. Id. at 264. Technically, Jones was charged both with possession of narcotics and other
activities that stemmed from possession. See id. at 258. Implicit in the Jones holding is that
automatic standing is granted not only to persons charged with possessory crimes, but also to
those charged with nonpossessory crimes of which an essential element is possession. This fact
was explicitly recognized by the Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390 (1968).
The Supreme Court later declared, however, that the automatic standing rule applies only
when possession of the seized evidence "at the time of the contested search and seizure" Is an
essential element of the crime charged. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973). Many
lower courts presently rely on the Brown rationale to thwart the defendant's efforts to gain
standing when charged with a crime of conspiracy to possess, distribute, transport or smuggle
contraband, claiming that possession at the time of the contested search and seizure is not an
essential element of the conspiracy crime. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 446
(9th Cir. 1978) (defendant denied automatic standing to challenge search because he had been
acquitted of possession charge and was appealing only his conviction on the conspiracy count);
United States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1299 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977) (defendant charged with both
possession of, and conspiracy to possess, stolen goods, given automatic standing only as to the
possessory count); United States v. Balsamo, 468 F. Supp. 1363, 1379 (D. Me. 1979) (defendant
charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana and possession of marijuana not granted
automatic standing once latter charge dismissed); United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F.
Supp. 690, 694-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (no automatic standinig when charged with conspiracy to
distribute and possess or transport controlled substances in interstate commerce), It is of some
significance that these courts have ignored the true facts of Jones. In United States v. Prueitt, 540
F.2d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1063 (1977), the defendant was denied
automatic standing because, although charged with conspiring to possess marijuana and posses-
sion of marijuana, the possessory count was later dismissed. The dissent noted that an individual
should meet the threshold requirement of Brown if he was " 'charged with an offense that
includes, as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure.' "Id. at 1009 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. at 229). The dissent pointed out that the majority incorrectly denied
automatic standing because it erroneously interpreted "charged" to mean "convicted." Id.; see
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 1977) (majority focusing on the crime charged
rather than the crime convicted when determining the issue of standing). "[Ilf standing is
predicated upon one count of the indictment that charges an offense that contains possession as
an ingredient, the defendant's automatic standing permeates the remaining counts based on
similar facts, even if none of them has a possession element." 540 F.2d at 1009 (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting). This conclusion is premised on the Jones Court's reversal of both the possessory and
nonpossessory counts because of the prosecution's need to " 'choose between opposing a motion to
suppress made before trial [on standing grounds] and basing the case upon possession.' " Id.
(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 n.1 (1960)). Because the arguments of the
Prueitt dissent have not been adopted by most courts, see, e.g., United States v. Powell, 587 F.2d
443, 446 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (court said defendant should be granted automatic standing
because he was charged with a possessory crime, but felt constrained to follow its Prueitt holding
as the law of the circuit); United States v. Balsamo, 468 F. Supp. 1363, 1379 (D. Me. 1979), a
number of problems still persist. First, police misconduct is not deterred in accordance with the
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another's fourth amendment protective shield by dispensing with an examina-
tion of whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the area
searched. This inevitably opens the door to vicarious fourth amendment claims
and widespread recourse to the exclusionary rule.
Eight years after the Jones decision, the Supreme Court recognized that a
person charged with a nonpossessory crime could face a predicament similar to
that presented inJones. In Simmons v. United States,43 the petitioner sought to
challenge the admissibility in evidence of a suitcase that implicated him as a
participant in a bank robbery. This case differed from Jones in that possession
did not both convict and confer standing, and therefore the rationale of the
automatic standing rule was inapposite. To prove successfully that his fourth
amendment rights were violated and that he had standing, however, the
defendant in Simmons had to incriminate himself by admitting ownership of
the suitcase. In effect, he, like his counterpart in Jones, had to prove an
essential element of the government's case. Recognizing this, the Court held
that unless the defendant makes no objection, his testimony in support of a
motion to suppress may not later be used at trial "on the issue of guilt."'"
Arguably, this holding eliminates the dilemma of self-incrimination for a
person charged with either possessory or nonpossessory crimes when admitting
possession of the crucial evidence is his sole avenue to standing. 45 To the extent
that a defendant's testimony at a preliminary hearing may be used against him
at trial for purposes other than proving guilt, however, the self-incrimination
dilemma is regenerated. If a defendant asserts a possessory interest in in-
criminating evidence at a suppression hearing and elects to take the stand on
his own behalf at trial, the earlier statements may be used for impeachment. 46
aims of the exclusionary rule because evidence seized in violation of a defendant's constitutional
rights would be admissible at trial if a sharp prosecutor charges him with conspiring to distribute
contraband, forsaking prosecution on the additional crime of possession. At least one court has
"express[ed] consternation" over why the defendant was not himself indicted for the possessory
offense rather than only the conspiracy offense. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 4S, 55 n.6 (2d
Cir. 1977) (discussing the court's prior decision in United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244 (2d
Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Giodano v. United States, 394 U.S.
310 (1969)). Second, "[a] difficult problem in the administration of criminal justice would arise if
on a multi-count indictment, the Court were to deny standing on some counts and grant
suppression on others. The prejudice to a defendant in such a situation could be substantial."
United States v. Galante, 547 F.2d 733, 740 n.13 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977).
43. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
44. Id. at 394.
45. The Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was concerned with the use of
incriminating statements at trial. Freedom from self-incrimination attaches only if the statements
may later be used against the defendant during a criminal prosecution. United States v.
Mandujano, 452 U.S. 564, 571-76 (1976); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
Thus, a defendant may not invoke the fifth amendment privilege if he is granted immunity from
prosecution. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S.
422, 439 (1956).
46. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 720-24 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
224-26 (1971). It may be argued that, to the extent Simmons permits a defendant's testimony at a
suppression hearing to be used for impeachment purposes at trial, the automatic standing rule
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Nevertheless, the Court stated in Brown v. United States47 that "[t]he self-
incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones decision, can no longer occur
under the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution. 4 8 Furthermore, be-
should be retained. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §
11.3, at 588-89 (1978). Professor LaFave points out that if a defendant, in considering whether to
contest the search and seizure, were forced to weigh the adverse consequences that may result if
the testimony he would give at the suppression hearing were used to impeach him at trial, then he
would in effect be compelled to elect between his fourth amendment and fifth amendment rights.
Id. at 589. This is precisely the dilemma the Supreme Court sought to avoid by its holding in
Jones. "The most important reason for retaining the Jones automatic standing rule, therefore, Is
to prevent that situation from arising in those cases where defendant's testimony at the motion to
suppress would be most destructive if usable to impeach his testimony at trial." Id. It is not
inevitable that this result would be a certainty if the automatic standing rule were replaced with
the Simmons rule. Unfortunately, several cases lend support to Professor LaFave's concern.
See, e.g., People v. Sturgis, 58 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 317 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1974) (defendant's
testimony in support of a motion to suppress may be used to impeach if the defendant chooses to
testify at trial), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975); cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1975)
(statements made by a defendant, when compliance with the Miranda warnings is lacking, may
be used for purposes of impeachment at trial); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971)
(same). But see New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979). In Portash, the Court held that
statements made to a grand jury after being given a use immunity could not later be used at a
trial for impeachment purposes. The Court reasoned that "[t]estimony given in response to a
grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony." Id. at 459. Hass and Harris
were distinguished on the ground that no claim was advanced in either case that the statements in
question were in any way coerced or involuntary; the Court noted that fact was central to the
Portash decision. Id. at 458; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (lass and Harris
inapplicable if the statements were in fact involuntary). Professor LaFave advocates that
testimony at a fourth amendment suppression hearing should not later be used to impeach
because it is also coerced in the Portash sense. 3 W. LaFave, supra, § 11.2, at 53-54 (Supp. 1980).
It should be noted that in Hass and Harris the Court, after balancing the need to deter police
misconduct with the strong policy against encouraging perjury, concluded that the interest In
preventing perjury should prevail. 420 U.S. at 722; 401 U.S. at 226. In determining whether
incriminating statements made by a defendant in an effort to gain standing to contest an alleged
illegal search and seizure are admissible for impeachment purposes, the same analysis will
probably be applied. If the Court adopts the view that the preliminary hearing testimony is only
subjectively compelled, it could easily decide, based on the precedent of Hass and Harris, that
that testimony could be used at trial for impeachment purposes. It may be argued that, after
Simmons, the self-incrimination dilemma arises only when the defendant intends to perjure
himself in making his defense, in other words, admit possession at the suppression hearing and
deny possession at trial. Therefore, any trial use of defendant's statements may be said to be
justified; a person under oath has testified that he will speak "truthfully and accurately." Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225; Brief for Petitioner at 21 n.14, United States v. Salvuccl, 599
F.2d 1094 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244). This argument fails,
however, because it is premised on the assumption that the defendant is guilty. The truly
innocent defendant may also commit perjury, not by way of defense, but to vindicate his
constitutional rights at the suppression hearing. Thus the government's argument leads to an
anomaly. The innocent defendant is coerced into committing perjury merely to have the
opportunity to contest the unconstitutional search and seizure. As the Simmons Court noted, it Is
"intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
another." 390 U.S. at 394.
47. 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
48. Id. at 228.
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cause Simmons requires the defendant to demonstrate his own privacy interest,
that decision also eliminates the possibility under Jones of a vicarious asser-
tion of fourth amendment rights.4 9 Both considerations foreshadow an even-
tual abandonment of the automatic standing rule. Indeed, the Brown Court
expressly postponed deciding whether the holding in Simmons renders the
automatic standing rule unnecessary, reserving that question for a case with
facts analogous to those in Jones, in which possession at the time of the
challenged search and seizure is the crucial element of the crime.50
49. Simmons v. United States. 390 U.S. 377. 389-90 (1968). The Simmons route to standing
only eliminates vicarious assertions of fourth amendment rights provided the problem of
prosecutorial self-contradiction is permitted to continue. If the government is not allowed to
challenge defendant's claim of possession at the preliminarz hearing, to the extent that possession
of seized items is sufficient to confer standing the possibility of vicarious assertions still exists. Of
course, only an innocent defendant could be said to be asserting the fourth amendment rights of
another under these circumstances. As to the guilty defendant, he is truthfully claiming his
possessory interest in the seized items, and unless the government adopts the ludicrous position of
contesting defendant's possession of those items, in effect, establishing the defendant's defense, he
may have standing. Even in the latter case, however, a possessor)' interest may be insufficient to
obtain standing. In United States v. Jeffers. 342 U.S. 48 (1951). the Court said the defendant
"unquestionably had standing to object to the seizure made without warrant or arrest unless the
contraband nature of the narcotics seized precluded his assertion, for purposes of the exclusionary
rule, of a property interest therein." Id. at 52. The Jeffers Court concluded that the contraband
"being his property.... he was entitled on motion to have it suppressed as evidence on his trial."
Id. at 54. If assertion of a possessory interest is all that is required to obtain standing, there is no
real difference between automatic standing and the Simmons requirement. A defendant, aware
that the advantages of the automatic standing rule are no longer available, will merely assert a
possessory interest in the contraband as a ground for standing, provided he is not fearful of later
impeachment should he take the stand for his defense at trial. See note 46 supra. In United States
v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228, (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976), however, the court
stated that "[t]he Supreme Court has never cited Jeffers as adopting [the theory that defendant's
interest in seized property gave him standing to challenge the search that led to the seizure] and
we are persuaded that it is not a correct reading of the Jeffers opinion itself." Id. at 233 (footnote
omitted). In United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 840 (1976),
the court noted that the teaching of Alderman v. United States. 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969--that
only those whose own fourth amendment rights have been violated by a search may seek
suppression of the fruits of that search-may erode the Jeffers holding. 532 F.2d at 1167. In
contrast, the court in State v. Sanders, 282 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979). reasoned that
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), confirmed the viability of Jeffers to the extent Jeffers
stands for the proposition that "a possessory or proprietary interest in the property seized is
sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment protection." 282 N.W.2d at 772 n.2 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court in Rakas, however, stated that "[s]tanding in Jeffers was based on Jeffers'
possessory interest in both the premises searched and the property seized." 439 U.S. at 136
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). The controlling factor is whether the defendant has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id. at 146-48; Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. Brown v. Unitecf States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 (1973). Some lower federal courts have not
waited for the Supreme Court to rule on the continued viability of the automatic standing rule.
See, e.g., United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1241-42 (6th Cir.) (Simmons eliminated the
automatic standing rule), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); United States v. Smith, 495 F.2d 668,
670 (10th Cir. 1974) (Simmons and Brown repudiate the automatic standing rule); cf. United
States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094, 1097-98 (1st Cir.) (Supreme Court must resolve whether
Simmons implicitly overruled Jones), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244); United
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A case such as the one alluded to in Brown is now before the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Salvucci,5 1 the two defendants were charged with unlawful
possession of checks stolen from the United States mails. The police seized the
checks during a search of an apartment rented by the mother of one
defendant.- 2 The defendants moved to suppress the seized checks on the
ground that the warrant authorizing the search was issued without sufficient
probable cause.5 3 The district court granted the motion and affirmed itself on
reconsideration, rejecting the government's argument that the defendants
lacked standing to contest the constitutionality of the search and seizure.A
4
The First Circuit upheld the lower court's order."- As to the issue of standing,
States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 499 n.19 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (questioned, but did not decide,
whether automatic standing survives), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979); United States v. Powell,
587 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1978) (doctrine of automatic standing is still viable); United States v.
Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 892 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (there are "serious doubts concerning the
viability of the 'automatic standing' rule in light of Simmons v. United States"), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 968 (1978). United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1977) (there are "misgivings
about the continued survival of the concept of automatic standing," but "until the Supreme Court
itself rules definitively on the matter," there is no question about its continued viability); United
States v. Anderson, 552 F.2d 1296, 1299 (8th Cir. 1977) (adherence to the automatic standing rule
absent "a clear mandate from the Supreme Court'); United States v. Alewelt, 532 F.2d 1165,
1167 (7th Cir.) (still accepts automatic standing), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 840 (1976); United States
v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264, 1266 (4th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 (1976). In
addition, some state courts have ruled on the issue. Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d
348, 349-50 (Ky. 1979) (Rakas "seems to reject the theory of Jones on 'standing' "), cert. granted,
100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-5146); State v. Ribera, - Mont. -, -, 597 P.2d 1164, 1168-69
(1979) (failed to grant standing to defendant charged with possessory crime, relying on Rakas,
Brown, and Simmons); State v. List, 166 N.J. Super. 368, 372, 399 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Super. Ct.
Crim. Div. 1979) (concluded that Rakas did away with automatic standing). But see State v.
Barrett, 170 N.J. Super. 211, 214, 406 A.2d 198, 200 (Super. Ct. Crim. Div. 1979) (List
interpretation of Rakas strained; automatic standing still viable).
51. 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244). This case is
being heard in conjunction with Rawlings v. Kentucky, 581 S.W.2d 348 (Ky.), cert. granted, 100
S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-5146). In Rawlings, the defendant was charged with possession of
controlled substances that were seized from the purse of an acquaintance during an illegal search.
Id. at 348-49. The court denied the defendant standing, claiming that Rakas had undercut the
automatic standing rule of Jones and that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to the purse. Id. at 349-50.
52. Id. at 1094. The affidavit submitted in support of the application for a search warrant
identified the premises to be searched as those of one defendant's wife, not of his mother. It was
established at the pretrial hearing that the apartment was in fact rented by that defendant's
mother. Brief for the United States at 2 n.1, United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir.),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244). Nevertheless, the court of appeals repeated the
error in its opinion. See id. The error as to the lessee of the premises did not render the warrant
void. The criterion is whether the premises are described with sufficient particularity so that a
stranger would be able to locate them. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976).
53. 599 F.2d at 1094-95. The defendants contended that probable cause was lacking because
the affidavit in" support of the search warrant failed to give the date on which the police learned
that contraband was present on the premises they desired to search. Id. at 1095-96. Unless the
magistrate knew the date, there was no way he could determine the timeliness of the information
and the warrant. Id. at 1096.
54. Id. at 1094-95.
55. Id. at 1098.
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the court of appeals noted that although the defendants did not have actual
standing because their own fourth amendment rights were not violated, they
nevertheless had automatic standing to contest the search. s 6 Acknowledging
that the self-incrimination dilemma had been eliminated by Simmons, the
court said:
[t]he Supreme Court itself has questioned, but unfortunately not decided, whether the
second prong of the Jones rationale, prosecutorial self-contradiction, alone justifies the
continued vitality of the doctrine of automatic standing .... Until the Supreme Court
rules on this question, we are not prepared to hold that the automatic standing rule of
Jones has been implicitly overruled by Simmons. That is an issue which the Supreme
Court must resolve.
7
To predict accurately the Supreme Court's decision on this issue, the analysis
must focus on the changes that have occurred in the concept of standing since
the Court's major pronouncement in Jones. The self-incrimination dilemma
has, at least in the Court's view, been eliminated by the Simmons holding.5 8
It is not simply the substitution of the Simmons rule, however, that will
gracefully permit the Court to discard the automatic standing rule; rather, it is
the evolving concept of standing and the Court's growing distaste for the
exclusionary rule that can no longer coherently subsume the rule. Because the
automatic standing rule can protect an individual under another's fourth
amendment rights, it enlarges the class of people for whom the exclusionary
56. Id. at 1097. Defendants did not have actual standing because they did not establish an
expectation of privacy in the premises searched or the property seized, nor did they claim any
proprietary interest in those premises or property. Id.
57. Id. at 1097-98 (citations omitted). Other circuit courts have not so willingly deferred
judgment to the Supreme Court on the continued survival of the automatic standing rule. See
note 50 supra. The potential for prosecutorial self-contradiction may no longer be a viable
concern. The current test for standing to contest a search and suppress the evidence seized is
whether the movant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. See note 49
supra and accompanying text. "In light of Rakas ... I presume that the Government would now
contend that its motion to strike is based not on a standing argument but on an argument that
[the defendant] did not have a 'legitimate expectation of privacy."' In re 2029 Hering St., Bronx,
N.Y., 464 F. Supp. 164, 172 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Therefore, at the suppression hearing the issue
is simply whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy; not until trial will the
argument center around defendant's possession of the seized contraband. As the Court said in
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), "even a property interest in premises may not be sufficient
to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to particular items located on the
premises." Id. at 144 n.12. Thus, the defendant may assert a possessory interest in the
contraband seized at the suppression hearing but still be denied standing because, "[iln consider-
ing the reasonableness of asserted privacy expectations, the Court has recognized that no single
factor invariably will be determinative." Id. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, "lilt is not in
any way inconsistent with [the principle against prosecutorial self-contradictionI for the govern-
ment to charge a defendant with a possessory offense defined in the criminal law and, at the same
time, to contend that no legitimate privacy expectation of the defendant's under the Fourth
Amendment was implicated in the search and seizure that uncovered the items illegally possessed.
The provisions of the penal code regarding possessory offenses are premised on different
considerations and are directed at different ends from the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment." Brief for the United States at 24, United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st
Cir.), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244).
58. See notes 43-48 supra and accompanying text.
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rule is an available remedy. If one accepts standing as a mere convenient term
that triggers an analysis into whether the contested search and seizure
violated the defendant's personal fourth amendment rights, the automatic
standing rule becomes no more than a relic that is not adaptable to modern
practices, and whose survival is no longer warranted or desirable.
In Salvucci, the Court is presently faced with resolving several of the
foregoing arguments advanced in opposition to the automatic standing rule." 9
In view of the Court's own language, it appears likely that it will expressly
terminate, after twenty years, the existence of automatic standing. 60 Neverthe-
less, although the arguments in favor of its demise are well reasoned in most
situations, the automatic standing rule and its attendant interrelationship with
the exclusionary rule are necessary to avoid an unwarranted invasion of con-
stitutional rights in particular situations.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PRESUMPTION STATUTES
A. The Applicable Tests
The constitutionality of statutory presumptions is subject to attack on due
process grounds. 61 The power of legislatures to create presumptions is itself
limited by a fundamental presumption, thd presumption of innocence which
acts in favor of all criminal defendants. 62 Therefore, presumption statutes must
comport with the due process requirement that the government prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. 63 The Supreme Court has set forth various tests for
measuring the compliance of criminal statutory presumptions with constitu-
tional due process requirements. The tests have not, however, met with com-
plete approval.
1. The "Rational Connection" Test
In Tot v. United States, 64 the Court reasoned that "a statutory presumption
cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the
other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common
59. Brief for the United States at 13-28, United States v Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir.),
cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979) (No. 79-244). The question presented for the Court's review,
as phrased by the government, is "[w]hether a defendant whose constitutional rights were not
violated by an unlawful search may nevertheless obtain suppression of an item seized during the
search solely because the indictment charges him, as an essential element of the offense, with
unlawful possession of that item at the time of the search." Id. at 2.
60. The Supreme Court itself has recognized that its present view of standing is on a collision
course with the automatic standing rule. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 135-38 & 135 n.4 (1978);
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1973).
61. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. Both amendments guarantee that no person shall be
deprived "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
62. B. Schwartz, supra note 12, § 7.16, at 271.
63. Id. at 272-73. The Supreme Court recognized as early as 1895 that the Constitution
permits a criminal conviction only if guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v. United
States, 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895); accord, In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
64. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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experience." 65 If a reasonable person could be convinced that the crime was
committed, not by direct proof, but by proof of some related fact, then proof of
that fact would be sufficient proof of the crime. 66 The jury must not be strained
by the terms of the statute to make the connection; the inference must be
consistent with arguments drawn from reason and experience.
6 7
The Tot test was accompanied by a "corollary," mandating that the relative
convenience of coming forward with the evidence be considered in determining
the constitutionality of presumption statutes. 68 If the defendant has clear access
to proof of the existence or nonexistence of the ultimate fact, the courts should
be inclined to find the questioned presumption valid. 69 Nevertheless, merely
because the critical information is more accessible to the defendant should not,
alone, justify the creation of presumptions.7 0
The Supreme Court applied the rational connection test in two subsequent
cases. In United States v. Gainey,7 1 the challenged statute made unex-
plained presence at a still presumptive evidence of the crime of carrying on
the business of a distiller without a bond.7 2 The Court declared that "Itihe
process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly
empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicial competence or com-
pletely commonplace, significant weight should be accorded the capacity of
Congress to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions from it.",7
3
Deferring to the congressional determination, the Court held that there was
a rational connection, sufficient to sustain the statute, between unexplained
presence at a still and the comprehensive crime of participation in the illegal
65. Id. at 467-68 (footnote omitted). The rational connection test was first stated in Mobile,
Jackson & K.LR.R.- v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910), a civil case.
66. 319 U.S. at 469. The statute in question made possession of a firearm by an individual
previously convicted of a violent crime, presumptive evidence that the firearm was received by him
in interstate commerce. Relying on the rational connection test, the Court reversed the possession
conviction. Id. at 468.
67. Id. at 467-68.
68. Id. at 467. The corollary was originally a test in itself. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82,
88-89 (1934); see Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 34 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 141, 142-43 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Presumptions]. This terminology has been
criticized because a true corollary is a "necessary inference from a stated principle or rule," and
therefore, by definition, a corollary may not reach a result different from the rule from which it is
derived. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A
Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165, 168 n.9 (1969). Although the Supreme Court has applied
the corollary several times, see, e.g., United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 360-64 (1950);
Rossi v. United States, 289 U.S. 89, 91-92 (1933), little guidance has been furnished in determining
the relative weight it should be accorded in the rational connection test. Despite the Tot Court's
explicit reduction of the comparative convenience test to a corollary, the Supreme Court later
remarked that the comparative convenience test was implicitly abandoned in Tot. Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 45 (1969).
69. See 319 U.S. at 469; Ashford & Risinger, supra note 68, at 168.
70. 319 U.S. at 469. To hold otherwise would place the burden of going forward on the
defendant, thereby alleviating the government's heavy burden of proof; this could only be done if
the defendant were not subject to "unfairness or hardship." Id. at 469-70 (footnote omitted).
71. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
72. I.R.C. 5601(b).
73. 380 U.S. at 67.
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distilling operation. 74 In contrast, in United States v. Romano, 75 the statutor-
ily created presumption of possession, custody, and control of a still arising
from mere presence at the site of the still was held unconstitutional under the
rational connection test.7 6 The Court distinguished Gainey, acknowledging
that, as in Gainey, presence at a still does suggest some role in the illegal
enterprise. Absent greater proof, however, presence alone does not indicate
participation in the "specialized functions" associated with possession 77- -" 'the
inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary .... " ,,78
2. The "More Likely Than Not" Test
In Leary v. United States,79 the Court set forth a test that, although derived
from the rationales of Tot, Gainey, and Romano, requires a deeper inquiry into
the empirical foundation of a statutory presumption. The challenged statute
made possession of marijuana sufficient evidence of the crime of knowing
illegal importation unless the defendant explains his possession to the satis-
faction of the jury. The Court held the presumption unconstitutional, reasoning
that "a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or
'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with
substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." 80
The Court noted that before it could determine the constitutionality of
inferring knowledge from possession, it was necessary to consider data regard-
ing the beliefs of marijuana users concerning the source of the drug they
consume. 8  The Court reviewed statistics derived from several exhaustive
studies as to the amount of and frequency with which marijuana is used, how
much marijuana in use is imported, and from where most marijuana is im-
ported.8 2 The challenged presumption was invalidated because there was no
actual proof that at least a majority of marijuana possessors were cognizant of
the origin of their marijuana.83 Thus, it was no longer sufficient to merely look
at "common experience" and a rational connection.8 4
74. Id. at 67-68. The Court noted that Congress was undoubtedly aware that a prerequisite to
manufacturing illegal liquor is locating an obscure site. "Legislative recognition of the implica-
tions of seclusion only confirms what the folklore teaches-that strangers to the illegal business
rarely penetrate the curtain of secrecy." Id. (footnote omitted).
75. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
76. Id. at 144.
77. Id. at 139-41.
78. Id. at 141 (quoting Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943)). "Presence is relevant
and admissible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some showing of the
defendant's function at the still, its connection with possession is too tenuous to permit a reasonable
inference of guilt .... " Id.
79. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
80. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 37-38.
82. Id. at 39-43.
83. Id. at 53.
84. Some commentators have noted that a rational connection is present even though the
presumed fact follows from the basic fact only 50.0001% of the time. Ashford & Risinger, supra
note 68, at 185. The connotation of the more likely than not test is that a percentage much greater
than half must be shown. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. at 52.
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3. The "Reasonable Doubt" Test
The Leary Court held that when proof of the crime charged or an essential
element thereof depends on the use of a presumption, the presumed fact must
at least be more likely than not to flow from the proved fact. The Court
declined to decide whether a criminal presumption that satisfies the more likely
than not test must also comply with the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard.8 5 Thus, the Court left unclear whether it must be beyond a reason-
able doubt that proof of the basic fact is proof of the ultimate fact.
In Turner v. United States,8 6 the Court upheld a statutory presumption that
made possession of heroin sufficient evidence for conviction of the crime of
knowing illegal importation. The Court stated that it had no reasonable doubt
that heroin is not domestically produced and, therefore, "[t]o possess heroin is
to possess imported heroin."87 Holding the statute satisfied both the standards
of the more likely than not test and the reasonable doubt test, the Court,
again, did not decide the question of which test should control in criminal
cases. 88
In Barnes v. United States, 8 9 the Court determined the constitutionality of a
jury instruction that permits a conviction for knowingly possessing stolen
property based on unexplained possession of recently stolen property. The
Court reasoned:
To the extent that the "rational connection," "more likely than not," and "reasonable
doubt" standard bear ambiguous relationships to one another, the ambiguity is traceable
in large part to variations in language and focus rather than to differences of substance.
What has been established by the cases, however, is at least this: that if a statutory
inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies the
reasonable-doubt standard (that is, the evidence necessary to invoke the inference is
sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond a reasonable doubt) as well
as the more-likely-than-not standard, then it clearly accords with due process.90
In Barnes, the evidence established that the petitioner possessed stolen checks
payable to people he did not know, and there was no evidence from which a
believable explanation of innocence could be deduced. Such proof was
sufficient for any jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner
knowingly possessed the stolen checks. 91 Therefore, because the inference
satisfied the most stringent standard of reasonable doubt, the Court concluded
that it comported with the requirements of due process and proper allocation of
the burden of proof. 92 Although the Court laid down the reasonable doubt
85. 395 U.s. at 36 n.64.
86. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
87. Id. at 416. The Court considered substantial statistical information showing that only
approximately two percent of the heroin illegally used was covertly produced in the United States.
Id. at 414 n.26. The statute was held invalid as it applied to cocaine because more of that drug is
produced within the United States than is illegally imported. Id. at 418-19 & 418 n.36.
88. Id. at 416; see Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843 (1973).
89. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
90. Id. at 843.
91. Id. at 845-46.
92. Id. at 846. The adversary system requires that the government "shoulder the entire load"
during the "contest" of trial. 8J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2251, at 317 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
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standard, it again failed to establish whether that test was constitutionally
compelled. 93
4. The "Allen" Test
County Court v. Allen 94 contains the latest Supreme Court pronouncement
on statutory presumptions. In Allen, the respondents were convicted of illegal
possession of two handguns that were seized by police officers after they had
stopped a speeding automobile in which the respondents and Jane Doe were
passengers. The guns allegedly protruded from Jane Doe's handbag, which was
positioned near her on the front seat or floor on the passenger side of the
vehicle. 95 At trial, the prosecution relied on a New York presumption statute
that made mere presence in a vehicle in which illegal firearms are discovered
proof of possession by all occupants. 96 The trial judge instructed the jury that
they could, in accordance with the statute, infer possession from respondents'
presence. 9 7 The district court granted the respondents habeas corpus relief and
93. See Brief for Petitioners, County Court v. Allen, 4,2 U.S. 140 (1979).
94. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
95. Id. at 143. Respondents were acquitted on a charge of possession of a machine gun and
heroin found in the trunk of the automobile.
96. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1980). This statute provides: "The presence in an
automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus, of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm
silencer, explosive or incendiary bomb, bombshell, gravity knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk,
stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuckles, chuka stick, sandbag, sandclub or slungshot is presump-
tive evidence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon,
instrument or appliance is found, except under the following circumstances: (a) if such weapon,
instrument or appliance is found upon the person of one of the occupants therein; (b) if such
weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile which is being operated for hire by a
duly licensed driver in the due, lawful and proper pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall
not apply to the driver, or (c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the occupants,
not present under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have and carry concealed the
same." Other states have enacted similar statutes: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3161 (1977) (applies to
machine guns only; no exceptions); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-38 (West 1975) (presence is "prima
facie" evidence of possession; no exceptions); Ill. Crim. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-1(c) (Smith-Hurd
1977); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-306 (1979) (applies to machine guns only; presence is "evidence" of
possession; no exceptions); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1011.19 (1975) (presence is "prima facie" evidence
of possession); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 39-2(a) (West Spec. Pamphlet 1979) (presence is presumptive
evidence of possession); N.D. Cent. Code § 62-01-03 (1960) (applies to pistols only; presence Is
"sufficient" evidence of possession); Va. Code § 18.2-292 (1950) (applies to machine guns only;
presence is "prima facie" evidence of possession; no exceptions). At least one of these statutes has
been held unconstitutional, although it has not been repealed. See State v. Watson, 165 Conn.
577, 597, 345 A.2d 532, 543 (1973); cf. State v. Humphreys, 54 N.J. 406, 415-16, 235 A.2d 273,
278-79 (1969) (predecessor statute held constitutional, but its use in jury instructions disallowed).
The Model Penal Code contains a presumption resembling the New York statute. Model Penal
Code § 5.06(3) (1961). In addition, an identical statute exists in New York and Vermont in regard
to controlled substances. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.25(1) (McKinney 1980); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §
4221(b) (1968). See generally 9 Unif. Laws Ann. 187-94 (Master Ed. 1979).
97. See 442 U.S. at 160-61 & n.20. The jury convicted Jane Doe and the three respondents. The
convictions were affirmed. People v. Lemmons, 49 A.D.2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (3d Dep't 1975),
aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976). The appellate division affirmed
without opinion. Two judges dissented in part, reasoning that the statute should not apply to the
passengers, because the statute excepts those situations in which the weapon is found on the person
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reversed the convictions, holding that the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of the case. 98 The Second Circuit affirmed, holding the
statute unconstitutional on its face because it lacked "the requisite empirical
connection between proved and presumed facts in the class of cases to which
the legislature made it applicable." 99 The Supreme Court reversed.' 0 0
At the outset of its opinion, the Court stated that "in criminal cases, the
ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity in a given case remains
constant: the device must not undermine the factfinder's responsibility at trial,
based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a
reasonable doubt."''° This suggests that the reasonable doubt test should be
used in the determination of a presumption's constitutionality. The Court,
however, distinguished a permissive presumption or inference from a manda-
tory presumption.1 0 2 The former only allows the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact from proof of the basic fact, whereas the latter requires the trier
of fact to find the ultimate fact on proof of the basic fact.'
0 3
A mandatory presumption may not only relieve the prosecution of the
burden of proving all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but
may also compel the defendant to prove his innocence. 104 Recognizing this,
the Court said that to pass constitutional scrutiny, a mandatory presumption
must be examined "on its face," devoid of any evaluation of its application to
specific circumstances. 105 Because the trier of fact cannot circumvent the
binding effect of the presumption by according greater weight to particular
facts, any other evidence presented by the prosecution is irrelevant to this
of one of the occupants. 49 A.D.2d at 640-41, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 245-46, see note 96 supra. In the
Court of Appeals, two judges also dissented in part on the same grounds. 40 N.Y.2d at 513-16. 354
N.E.2d at 841-44, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 102-04.
98. The district court decision is unreported. See Allen v. County Court, 569 F 2d 998, 1001
(2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
99. Id. at 1011.
100. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
101. Id. at 156. The Court derived support for its conclusion from In re Winship, 397 U S. 358
(1970), wherein the Court held that proof at a juvenile proceeding must be beyond a reasonable
doubt: " 'No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try
him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them . . , is sufficient to show
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged'"
Id. at 363 (quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895)); see 442 U.S. at 156.
102. 442 U.S. at 157. The dissent correctly points out that, prior to Allen, the Court had never
recognized the mandatory/permissive distinction as important when analyzing presumptions used
in criminal cases. Id. at 176 (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 157.
104. Id. The Court further classified mandatory presumptions into two catagories, one in
which the burden of going forward with the evidence is shifted to the defendant, the other in which
the entire burden of proof is shifted to the defendant. Id. at 157 n.16. The Court noted that the
presumptions involved in the earlier cases of Turner, Leary., Romano and Tot -never totally
removed the ultimate burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt from the prosecution." ld,
Although the Court has not addressed whether mandatory presumptions must meet the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, the above language suggests that if a presumption does shift the burden
of proof, it must comply with the reasonable doubt test formulated in Barnes. See notes 85-93 supra
and accompanying text.
105. 442 U.S. at 158.
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analysis-the key criterion is the presumption's accuracy. 10 6 With a manda-
tory presumption, "since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing
guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption unless the fact proved
is sufficient to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."' 0 7 A
permissive presumption, however, does not shift the burden of proof to the
defendant. 108 It will affect "the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard only if,
under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the
connection permitted by the inference."'1 9 A permissive presumption can be
used together with other government evidence to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is but one element of proof, to be treated in the same
manner as other evidence, and therefore need only meet the Leary test rather
than the reasonable doubt standard. 011
After reviewing the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the Court conclu-
ded that the New York statute created a permissive presumption; the pre-
sumption was only part of the prosecution's case, and the jury was free to
reject it regardless of whether any proof was offered in rebuttal. I I " The Court
therefore held that it was improper to decide the constitutionality of the
presumption on its face, an analysis strictly reserved for mandatory presump-
tions. 112
Turning to whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the circum-
stances of the case, the Court concluded that Jane Doe, a sixteen year old girl,
was unlikely to be the sole possessor of two large guns when in the company
of three older men. Instead, it was more probable that, having been stopped
for speeding, the respondents feared a search was imminent and consequently
attempted to conceal their weapons by placing them in her handbag.,"
"[T]here [was] a 'rational connection' between the basic facts that the prose-
cution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter [was] 'more
likely than not to flow from' the former."' " 4 Finding the statute satisfied the
Leary test and that the record as a whole was sufficient to prove respondents'
106. Id. at 159.
107. Id. at 167.
108. Id. at 157. The Court appears inconsistent in its analysis of permissive presumptions and
their relation to shifting burdens. Although it claims that "no burden of any kind" is placed on the
defendant where a permissive presumption is involved, the Court notes that the basic fact may be
prima facie evidence of the presumed fact. Id. When the defendant is confronted with prima facie
evidence of guilt, however, he necessarily assumes the burden of producing evidence in rebuttal.
See W. Richardson, Evidence § 96, at 72 (10th ed. J. Prince 1973).
109. 442 U.S. at 157. The Uniform Rules of Evidence refuse to recognize a mandatory
presumption, instead adopting a rule similar to the permissive presumption defined by the Court.
Uniform Rule of Evidence 303. The rule on presumptions in criminal cases says that a jury should
be allowed to decide the question of guilt of a presumed fact only if a reasonable juror, on all the
evidence presented, "could find ... the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. 303(b).
110. 442 U.S. at t67.
111. Id. at 160-61. The Court said.that, "[iln deciding what type of inference or presumption is
involved in a case, the jury instructions will generally be controlling, although their interpretation
may require recourse to the statute involved and the cases decided under it." Id. at 157 n,16.
112. Id. at 160. The Court seemed surprised that the New York Court of Appeals never
discussed the jury instructions. See id. at 157 n.16.
113. Id. at 163-64.
114. Id. at 165 (footnote omitted).
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guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court held that the jury verdict should
be reinstated.
B. The Arguments in Opposition to Presumption Statutes
The opinions setting forth the Supreme Court's changing approach to
presumption statutes were repeatedly met by vigorous dissents. 15 Dissenting
in United States v. Gainey," 6 Justice Black stated that the Court had long
subscribed to the idea that a presumption, even if rational or valid, could not
be used to convict a person of a crime if its application would deprive the
accused of a constitutional right.i1 7 Presumptions may deprive criminal
defendants of their right to due process, because the presumption may relieve
the prosecution of its burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; of their privilege against self-incrimination, in that use of a
presumption can effectively compel the defendant to testify; and of their right
to a jury trial, to the extent a presumption directs the jury's verdict."18
Until the Court imposes a standard of review that is more rigorous than
the rational connection test, the prosecution is able to use presumptions and
inferences to secure a defendant's imprisonment even though evidence of an
essential element of the crime may be totally lacking.119 For example, in
Turner v. United States, 120 the Court upheld a conviction despite the prose-
115. See notes 116-44 infra and accompanying text. "Once the thumbscrew and the following
confession made conviction easy; but that method was crude and, I suppose, now would be
declared unlawful upon some ground. Hereafter, presumption is to lighten the burden of the
prosecutor. The victim will be spared the trouble of confessing and will go to his cell without
mutilation or disquieting outcry." Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 420 (1928) (McReynolds,
J., dissenting).
116. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
117. Id. at 80 (Black, J., dissenting); see Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911).
Dissenting in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). Justice Black listed the constitutional
rights of the criminal defendant he thought were weakened by the use of presumptions. They are:
"1. His right not to be compelled to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury; 2. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him; 3. The right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself; 4. The
right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; S. The right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; 6. The right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses for his defense; 7. The right to counsel; and 8. The right to trial by an impartial jury."
Id. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting).
118. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. at 79-80 (Black, J., dissenting). "[\Where a man's
life, liberty, or property is at stake, the prosecution must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. at 79. Requiring that guilt be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case [is]
bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan. J.,
concurring); see Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 854 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 850 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States
v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 83 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Using presumptions in this manner has
been termed "First Aid to the District Attorney." Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the
District Attorney, 14 A.B.A.J. 287, 287 (1928). Justice Douglas remarked that "the Bill of Rights
was designed to make the job of the prosecutor difficult." Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. at 8S2
(Douglas, J., dissenting); see note 92 supra.
120. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
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cution's failure to satisfy its burden of proof on two critical elements of the
crime. Specifically, the defendant was charged with the crime of "receiv[ing],
conceal[ing], [and] facilitat[ing] the transportation, concealment, or sale of a
... narcotic drug ... knowing the same to have been imported ... into the
United States contrary to law."' 12' To establish a prima facie case, the
government, with the aid of a presumption statute, needed to show only that
the defendant possessed heroin, not that the heroin was illegally imported nor
that the defendant knew it was illegally imported. 122 In the words of Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Barnes v. United States, 123 using presumptions and
inferences to prove specific elements of a crime is "treacherous" and "impli-
cates the integrity of the judicial system.' 2 4
Additionally, statutory presumptions may be found constitutionally defec-
tive on the ground that they contravene the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.12 5 A presumption "rob[s] the defendant of at least part of
his presumed innocence and cast[s] upon him the burden of proving that he is
not guilty.' 2 6 It forces the defendant to testify regardless of the possibility
that his testimony might jeopardize his chances for acquittal, because a failure
to testify in the face of a presumption will, in effect, destroy those chances. 127
This, stated Justice Black, is in violation of the fifth amendment.' 12
Moreover, a statutory presumption, presented as an authoritative man-
date, may so strongly influence a jury that it would effectively preclude the
right to trial by jury. 129 Statutory presumptions incorporated into a jury
charge tend to induce "the jury to reach an inference which [it] might not
otherwise have thought justified, to push some jurors to convict who might
not otherwise have done so.' 30 The effect of undue influence on a jury was
Justice Powell's main concern when he, joined by three Justices, dissented in
County Court v. Allen. '3' Both the majority and the dissent agreed that when
analyzing presumptions, due process required two things: first, the prosecu-
tion must prove the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt; and second,
121. 21 U.S.C. § 174, 70 Stat. 570 (1956), repealed, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1291 (1970),
122. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. at 428-32 (Black, J., dissenting). Turner's trial
reminded Justice Black of "Daniel being cast into the lion's den [rather than) of a constitutional
proceeding." Id. at 430 (Black, J. dissenting).
123. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
124. Id. at 850 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
125. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v.
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
126. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
127. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see 4 Colum. J.L.
& Soc. Prob. 215, 221 (1968).
128. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 79-80 (Black, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 87 (Black, J., dissenting); see Criminal Presumptions, supra note 68, at 152
(presumption can unduly sway the jury because their use gives the prosecutor a "bonus for making
out his case"). It was once the Court's view that statutory presumptions tend to influence the jury.
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 237 (1911) ("The normal assumption is that the jury will follow
the statute and, acting in accordance with the authority it confers, will accept as sufficient what
the statute expressly so describes.").




whenever a jury is instructed that it may infer an ultimate fact from a basic
fact, the former must be more likely than not to flow from the latter.' 32
The dissent, however, rejected what it termed the Court's "novel approach"
in distinguishing mandatory from permissive presumptions, claiming that the
majority failed to examine adequately whether the presumption in question
satisfied the second prong of this due process test. 13 3 By itself, an individual's
presence in an automobile cannot be said to indicate his dominion and control
over everything within it. 134 Because the New York penal code defines
"possession" as having dominion or control, 135 it is not more likely than not
that persons in an automobile where weapons are found are the possessors of
those weapons.1 36 As the Court previously acknowledged, there had been no
earlier cases in which courts sustained convictions for possessory crimes
merely on a showing of presence.' 37 "The crime remains possession, not
presence, and, with all due deference to [legislative] judgment .... the
former may not constitutionally be inferred from the latter." 83 The Allen
Court circumvented this apparent inconsistency by reasoning that when a
presumption is categorized as permissible, its use is permitted if other
sufficient evidence exists to support a finding of guilt.' 39 The dissent argued
that this approach is not in accord with prior decisions; moreover, the
majority's analysis disturbingly ignores the possibility that a jury might
disbelieve all other evidence adduced at trial and reach its verdict solely on
the strength of the presumption statute. 4
0
A final argument in opposition to the constitutionality of presumption
statutes, at least as they relate to presence in an automobile, may be gleaned
from the legislative purpose underlying the statute challenged in Allen. Prior
to the passage of the current statute's predecessor, prosecutors often found it
impossible to convict passengers of automobiles in which contraband was
found.1 4' The difficulty arose because the state was unable under such
circumstances to point to and prove possession by any particular individual
present in the vehicle.' 42 Thus, it has been argued that "[i]ronically, the
132. Id. at 156, 166-67; id. at 172 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell expressed his view
that "factual inferences [must] be accurate reflections of what history, common sense, and experi-
ence tell us about the relations between events in our society." Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 172 n.6, 176 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 175-76 (Powell, J., dissenting).
135. N.Y. Penal Law § 10.00(8) (McKinney 1975).
136. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. at 176 (Powell, J., dissenting). Some commentators
criticize the use of constructive possession as a basis for conviction, reasoning that it contradicts
the state's burden of "overcom[ing] all reasonable inferences of innocence." Whitebread &
Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotic Cases: To Have and Have Not, 58 Va. L. Rev. 751,
765 (1972).
137. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 141 (1965).
138. Id. at 144.
139. 442 U.S. at 160.
140. Id. at 176 (Powell, J., dissenting).
141. People v. Logan, 94 N.Y.S.2d 681, 683 (Sup. Ct. 1949), modified, 276 A.D. 1029, 95
N.Y.S.2d 806 (2d Dep't 1950).
142. Id. at 683. The legislative history supports the view that the statute was enacted to help
convict passengers in automobiles. When automobiles contain more than one person, "it is practi-
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presumption [statute] was enacted, not because the inference authorized
therein was rational, but rather because the courts and juries had uniformly
rejected it as irrational.' 43 By attempting to override the juries' refusal to
believe the prosecution's argument that presence in an automobile made it
more likely than not that the occupant also possessed any contraband found
therein, the legislature manifested a belief that state sanctioned prodding
would convince a jury to reach the desired result.144
III. STANDING ABSENT AUTOMATIC STANDING JUXTAPOSED WITH
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
A. The Impending Problem
Dispensing with automatic standing would have a significant impact on
those persons accused of illegal possession of contraband when the critical
evidence of the crime, the contraband itself, was seized pursuant to a search
of an automobile in which the defendant was a passenger and guest. If the
Supreme Court severs this approach to standing, it would essentially deny the
defendant passenger any opportunity to contest the search of the vehicle in
which he rode. The probative effect given to presumptions statutes com-
pounds the potential problem.
In Rakas v. Illinois, 145 the seminal case in altering fourth amendment
concepts and the standing doctrine, 1 46 the Supreme Court not only laid much
of the groundwork in opposition to the automatic standing rule, but it created
new law with respect to a passenger's right to fourth amendment protec-
tion. 147 The defendants in Rakas were convicted of armed robbery. A rifle
cally impossible for the police authorities and the District Attorneys to secure a conviction on the
charge of unlawful possession of a gun." Letter of Nathan A. Smith, Chairman, Comm. on
Criminal Court, reprinted in Bill Jacket for 1936 New York Laws, Chapters 216 and 390. In
support of the 1963 version of the statute, Senator Erway commented that "[tlhe presumption of
possession of a dangerous weapon in an automobile is most necessary to proper police work.
Before this enactment, it was impossible to prove possession if the article was found in an
automobile occupied by several people." Letter of Sen. Erway (Apr. 4, 1961), reprinted in Senate
Bill Jacket for 1961 New York Laws, Chapter 500. Other supporters believed that "if the weapon is
found in an automobile and all persons in the automobile deny ownership, the police officer is
helpless." Recommendation of Arthur Cornelius, Jr., Sup't., N.Y.S. Troopers, reprinted its
Senate Bill Jacket for 1961 New York Laws, Chapter 500.
143. Brief for Respondents at 33, County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
144. For a discussion of other New York cases involving the state's presumption statutes,
see Rose, The Automobile Presumption in the New York Narcotics Law, 42 Fordham L. Rev.
761, 764-69 (1974); Comment, Possession of Dangerous Drugs in a Car-New York's Criminal
Presumption Statute, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 188, 192-97 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Criminal
Presumption Statute].
145. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
146. Id. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting). See generally The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 3;
Fourth Amendment Guarantees, supra note 3.
147. Prior to Rakas, persons "legitimately on the premises" at the time of a search were viewed
as having an interest therein worthy of standing to challenge its legality. Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 267 (1960). Presence at the time of the search and seizure was later reaffirmed by a
unanimous Court as being a "sufficient source of standing in itself." Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 227 n.2 (1973). Lower courts were quick to notice that premises could include automo-
biles, thereby rendering presence in the automobile a sufficient basis for a passenger's fourth
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and shells, seized from under the front seat and from the glove compartment
during a search of an automobile in which defendants were passengers, were
admitted into evidence despite a motion to suppress. The defendants con-
ceded they did not own the automobile searched; they also denied ownership
of the incriminating evidence.' 48 The lower courts refused to decide the
merits of the suppression motion, saying that as mere passengers, the movants
did not have standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle. ' 49
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants contended they had
standing based on an alternative holding in Jones v. United States, 10
namely, that anyone "legitimately on the premises" had a sufficient interest in
the area searched to be afforded the protection of the fourth amendment.' 5 '
The defendants drew an analogy between themselves, as passengers in a
friend's automobile, and petitioner Jones, a guest in a friend's apartment. 
5 2
The Court rejected the comparison and confirmed its prior holdings 5 3 that
the range of fourth amendment protection should not be defined to embrace
amendment protection. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 892 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1968); Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 n.I (9th
Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94,
105 (4th Cir. 1962). In fact, the Supreme Court itself subscribed to this doctrine. Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 222 (1968) (Court went directly to merits of search and
suppressed evidence against passengers seized during illegal search of automobile); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960) (Court went directly to legality of seizure pursuant to search of
taxicab in which petitioner was riding).
148. 439 U.S. at 130.
149. 46 MI. App. 3d 569, 571, 360 N.E.2d 1252, 1253 (1977), aff'd, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
150. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
151. 439 U.S. at 132; see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). In Jones, the
petitioner was staying at a friend's home when the search occurred. The Court rejected lower court
distinctions between "lessee" or "licensee," Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381, 384 (D.C. Cir.
1945); United States v. De Bousi, 32 F.2d 902, 903 (D. lass. 1929), "invitees," Jones v. United
States, 262 F.2d 234, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1958), rev'd, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), and "guests," Gaskins v.
United States, 218 F.2d 47, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam), and granted the petitioner standing.
The Court stated that "it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical." 362 U.S. at 266.
152. 439 U.S. at 140-41. The petitioners also tried to revive the "target theory" of Jones which
permits one "against whom the search was directed", 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960), to have standing.
The Court rejected this theory, reasoning that the statement from Jones was simply an alternative
way of describing an individual who had been" 'a victim of a search or seizure,' "439 U.S. at 135
(quoting Jones v. United States, 361 U.S. 257, 261 (1960)) and that "[t]o the extent that the language
might be read more broadly, it is dictum . . . which we now expressly reject." Id.
153. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973) (petitioners denied standing to contest search
of co-conspirator's store from which stolen goods were seized); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969) (petitioners denied standing to contest legality of electronic surveillance when they
were neither a party to conversation overheard nor the owners of the premises where conversations
occurred); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (petitioner denied standing to contest
admissibility of narcotics illegally seized in search of an acquaintance's apartment).
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those who have not had their own rights infringed.' 4 This approach guards
against vicarious assertions of fourth amendment claims, thereby limiting the
use of the exclusionary rule during criminal trials. As the Court noted, "[e]ach
time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights."'"s The implication is that the
Court is primarily concerned with the frequent use of the exclusionary rule to
suppress evidence that directly bears on the defendant's guilt. Without such
evidence, the prosecution might be obliged to drop the charges, thereby
short-circuiting society's interest in convicting lawbreakers. 156 To limit stand-
ing is to limit the adverse effects of the exclusionary rule.
15
Therefore, the Court held "that the phrase 'legitimately on premises'
creates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights."'u5
Instead, the Court ratified the test set forth in Katz v. United States, '59 that
protection of the fourth amendment depends on whether the person claiming
the protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded,
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "160 Relying on this
objective test 161 and recognizing that automobiles are inherently places of
lessened expectations of privacy,162 the Rakas Court held that the defendants,
154. 439 U.S. at 133-34. " 'Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.' "Id. (quoting Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). The Court further stated that to confer "standing to raise
vicarious Fourth Amendment claims would necessarily mean a more widespread invocation of the
exclusionary rule during criminal trials." Id. at 137.
155. Id.
156. P. Chevigny, Police Power 183 (1969) ("For most crimes involving contraband, a success-
ful 'motion to suppress' ends the prosecution, because there can be no conviction without the
concrete evidence."); Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the American Law of Search and Seizure, 52
J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 246, 249 (1961).
157. 439 U.S. at 137-38.
158. Id. at 142 (footnote omitted). The Court also noted that the phrase was probably never
intended to be so broad and was misinterpreted by lower courts in their literal application of the
language. Id. at 142 n. 10. The source of the lower courts' confusion is undoubtedly the Supreme
Court's own language in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), wherein the Court stated
that standing would be granted if defendant was on the premises at the time of the search and
seizure. Id. at 227, 229 & 227 n.2; see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 157-58 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting). The Rakas Court did not absolutely preclude an individual legitimately on the
premises from contesting the lawfulness of the seizure of the evidence or the search when his
own property was seized during the search. The petitioners in Rakas, however, did not assert
ownership of the items seized. See id. at 130 n.1. Of course, absent automatic standing, an
assertion of possession in accordance with Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), may
lead to impeachment if ownership were subsequently denied at trial. See note 46 supra.
159. 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
160. 439 U.S. at 143-49; see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Prior to Katz, standing was mostly dependent on a property interest. See notes 20,
36 supra.
161. See note 24 supra. The dissent cogently observed that to deny passengers standing is to
ignore "the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share." 439 U.S. at 167 (White, J.,
dissenting).
162. 439 U.S. at 148; see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
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as passengers in an automobile who claimed no possessory or proprietary
interest in the automobile or the property seized, had no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy "with respect to those portions of the automobile which were
searched and from which incriminating evidence was seized."'' 63 Consequent-
ly, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that standing to raise a
fourth amendment claim did not exist; hence, the exclusionary rule was
inapplicable and the evidence seized was admissible at trial.1
6 1
The Court offered no explanation as to what, short of a property interest,
would give passengers a sufficient expectation of privacy to warrant constitu-
tional protection.' 65 To challenge a search, an individual must demonstrate
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects." 417 U.S. at 590.
163. 439 U.S. at 149 (footnote omitted). The result in Rakas is not limited to automobile
searches. The Rakas analysis is easily applicable to other situations, most disturbingly searches of
private homes. See The Exclusionary Rule, supra note 3, at 253. In one case, United States v.
Baltazar, 477 F. Supp. 236 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). the defendant was visiting a friend's apartment when
the apartment was searched and cocaine found. The defendant was charged with possession of
cocaine. Although the court felt "constrained to apply [the automatic standing] rule," id. at 245, it
noted that defendant's status as a mere guest was insufficient to establish "any interest in the
premises... such as would support a Fourth Amendment claim." Id. at 244. It is hard to fathom
how this court, under these circumstances, could conclude that defendant's expectation of privacy
was not one "society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "See Katz v. United States. 389 U.S.
347, 361 (1967); cf. Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (held, citing
Rakas, that defendant who worked in and had a key to building owned by his father had no
standing to contest search thereof, because he had no possessor' interea nor expectation of
privacy due to access to the building by others); State v. Tidwell, 23 Wash. App. 506, 1,
597 P.2d 434, 436 (Ct. App. 1979) (held, citing Rakas, that guest had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in motel room, despite having key to the room, because there was no evidence that the
room was registered to him or that he occupied it).
164. Mr. Justice White noted that the majority departed sharply from the Court's conclusion
in Katz that property interests should not control in determining whether the government has
invaded constitutionally protected regions. 439 U.S. at 162-63, 166-68 (White, J., dissenting).
Although "the Court asserts that it is not limiting the Fourth Amendment bar against unreason-
able searches to the protection of property rights, ... in reality it is doing exactly that." Id. at 164
(White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). If an individual in a business office, Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 365, 370 (1968), in a friend's apartment, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 259, 265-67 (1960), in a taxicab, Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 255-62 (1960), or in a
telephone booth, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348, 353 (1967), has fourth amendment
protection, then certainly a person riding in an automobile next to his friend should be similarly
shielded from government abuse. 439 U.S. at 163. (White, J., dissenting). The dissent suggested
that "[i]f the Court is troubled by the practical impact of the exclusionary rule, it should face the
issue of that rule's continued validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an attempt to
reach what are perceived as the correct results in specific cases." Id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting).
165. 439 U.S. at 165 (White, J., dissenting) ("Insofar as the Court's rationale is concerned, no
passenger in an automobile, without an ownership or possessory interest and regardless of his
relationship to the owner, may claim Fourth Amendment protection against illegal stops and
searches of the automobile in which he is rightfully present."). It is evident that lower courts have
felt constrained by the Court's holding. Lower courts have adopted the view that Rakas stands for
the proposition that property interests are necessary before a passcnger may contest the lawfulness
of an automobile search. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 474 F. Supp. 943, 946 (C.D. Cal. 1979)
(an individual must assert one of three interests to challenge constitutionality of search and
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only that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. 166
In Rakas, the search leading to the incriminating evidence was not restricted
to the places where the evidence was found, the glove compartment and
under the front seat. Instead, it would be correct to classify the total interior
of the automobile as the area searched. A denial of standing under these
circumstances necessarily xmeans that the Court, despite its insistence to the
contrary, 167 in fact held that a passenger lawfully present in an automobile
"may not invoke the exclusionary rule and challenge a search of that vehicle
unless he happens to own or have a possessory interest in it."168 Furthermore,
Justice White, dissenting with three Justices, argued that the Rakas decision
undercuts the force of the exclusionary rule in the one area in which its use is most
certainly justified-the deterrence of bad-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment.
• . . The danger of such bad faith is especially high in cases such as this one where the
officers are only after the passengers and can usually infer accurately that the driver is
the owner. The suppression remedy for those owners in whose vehicles something is
seizure, namely, a property or possessory interest in the automobile or a property interest in the
things seized); United States v. Rivera, 465 F. Supp. 402, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (passenger lacks
standing to challenge search and seizure of items from automobile when he fails to demonstrate
any proprietary interest in the automobile or the items seized, because he necessarily lacks
reasonable expectation of privacy).
166. 439 U.S. at 143; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
167. 439 U.S. at 149 n.17.
168. Id. at 156 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The Court appears to be saying that
the expectation of privacy test should consider only where the incriminating evidence is found, not
the area searched. See id. at 148-49. This is in sharp contrast to the Court's interpretation of Katz:
"capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends... upon whether the person
who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place." Id. at 143 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)) (emphasis added).
Because the entire interior of the automobile was "invaded," the Court's holding must hinge on the
exact place where the contraband was found. Such an outcome is not only contrary to precedent but
can lead to absurd results. For instance, clearly unreasonable police searches could be Justified
simply by showing that the evidence was eventually found in an unprotected area. It appears,
however, that there may be no protected areas for a passenger in an automobile. As the Rakas
Court held, the glove compartment, under the seat, and the trunk are unprotected areas as to the
passenger. Id. at 148-49. Yet if the incriminating evidence is exposed, it is subject to seizure under
the plain view doctrine because, by definition, no expectation of privacy has been manifested,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971). The doctrine of plain view has been
adopted by the lower courts to deny passengers standing. United States v. Rivera, 465 F. Supp.
402, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defendant passenger did not have standing to contest the seizure of
items from the rear of a station wagon); Pollard v. State, - Ind. -, -, 388 N.E.2d 496,
502-03 (1979) (if defendant had been a passenger, he would not have been able to object to a
search of front and rear seat and removal of items in plain view). But see United States v.
Crawford, No. F-1500-79, slip. op. at 6 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 1980) (despite language inRakas,
court held passenger has legitimate expectation of privacy in automobile). One court, citing
Rakas, held that the defendant did noi manifest an expectation of privacy sufficient to contest the
seizure of chemicals, which were evidence of illegal drug production, from the trunk of the
automobile in which he was a passenger. United States v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 65, 73 (E.D. Pa.
1979). What is remarkable about the Taylor holding is that the agents who conducted the search
had earlier observed the defendant buying chemicals and storing them in the trunk of the
automobile. Id. at 72. Surely, such behavior should be indicative of an expectation of privacy with
respect to both the chemicals and the trunk from which they were seized.
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found and who are charged with crime is small consolation for all those owners and
occupants whose privacy will be needlessly invaded by officers following mistaken
hunches not rising to the level of probable cause but operated on in the knowledge that
someone in a crowded car will probably be unprotected if contraband or incriminating
evidence happens to be found. After this decision, police will have little to lose by
unreasonably searching vehicles occupied by more than one person.' 69
Justice White's fears cannot be dismissed as speculative. It has been
observed that overzealous police officers, intent on improving their arrest
record,' 70 will often forsake admission of evidence against some defendants to
gain evidence that will be admissible against others who lack constitutional
protection from the search.17 ' For example, it has been reported that narcot-
ics police comprehend their job to be one of controlling drug traffic, and that
they are therefore primarily interested in apprehending the drug user regard-
less of his actual guilt of a crime at the time of his arrest. 7 Such misconduct
was of concern to the Rakas dissenters, provoking them to claim that
"[i]nsofar as passengers are concerned, the Court's opinion . . . declares an
'open season' on automobiles."' 73 To further limit access to standing by
169. 439 U.S. at 168-69 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens) (footnotes and citations omitted). The defendant may assert a possessory interest in the
contraband seized at the suppression hearing but still be denied standing. See note 57 supra. The
plain view doctrine is a recognition of this principle. Although an individual may clearly be in
possession of contraband, the item is subject to seizure by a police officer if it is exposed in plain
view. See note 25 supra. Standing to assert a fourth amendment claim would fail because, as the
plain view doctrine implies, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy toward the seized item.
See note 168 supra. Under the rationale of the plain view doctrine, no search occurs when the
contraband is seized. See United States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1078 (1976). In that case, the defendant was charged with possession of a firearm after a
bomb was discovered during a search of the trunk of another person's automobile. The defendant
admitted a property interest in the bomb and claimed he had standing to contest the search on
that ground alone. Id. at 229-30. The court reasoned that because the search did not violate the
defendant's rights, it was as if the bomb had been found in plain view in a public place and then
seized. Id. at 230. This court, although correctly deciding that no illegal search occurred,
mistakenly gave defendant standing to challenge the search; in view of Rakas, standing should
have been denied because "the analysis belongs more properly under the heading of substantive
Fourth Amendment doctrine than under the heading of standing .. " 439 U.S. at 140.
Similarly, regardless of an individual's possessory interest in things not in plain view, if there has
been no showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy toward those items, the seizure and the
search that led to them did not involve a search and seizure in the constitutional sense.
170. See B. Forst, J. Lucianovic & S.J. Cox, What Happens After Arrest? 64 (Institute for
Law & Social Research, PROMIS Research Project No. 4 1977).
171. White & Greenspan, supra note 10 at 348. Professors White and Greenspan suggest that
the Supreme Court, in developing privacy interests as the litmus of fourth amendment protection,
has "foster[ed] cynicism in law enforcement officers by providing them with an opportunity readily
to circumvent [the exclusionary rule's] operation." Id.
172. P. Chevigny, supra note 156, at 151-52. "[T]he policeman sees his job as one of catching
criminals, not of enforcing the Constitution." Id. at 183; see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). ("We must remember that the extent of any privilege of
search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret and apply themselves
and will push to the limit.").
173. 439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the possibility of "open
season" on automobiles was somewhat curtailed in the case of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
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discarding the automatic standing rule is to add greater vitality to those
concerns.
Moreover, presumption statutes that make presence in an automobile
containing illegal firearms or narcotics sufficient evidence to convict all the
occupants of unlawful possession 17 4 provide police officers with additional
incentive for conducting bad faith searches of automobiles carrying more than
one person. Not only may they pad their arrest record, but they may procure
for the prosecution a prima facie case for conviction. 175 Desire to convict is
evidenced by the willingness shown by some police officers to distort the truth
to avoid the exclusionary rule sanction when they feel certain they have
arrested someone that is, at least, peripherally connected with crime. 176
Logically, in jurisdictions where similar presumption statutes have not been
adopted and the prosecution must prove dominion and control of the con-
traband to sustain a charge of possession, the incentive for police misconduct
is severely curtailed. 177 An arrest resulting in a dismissal differs radically from
(1979). In that case, the Court held "that except in those situations in which there is at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of
law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in ordsr to check his driver's license and tile
registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 663.
Nevertheless, one of the exceptions delineated by the Court presents the potential for police
misconduct. It is safe to say that many vehicles presently driven on the public highways could be
cited for some minor violation upon visual inspection, thereby affording a police officer an
opportunity to stop the automobile lawfully. For example, a police officer could pull a vehicle
over for a dirty license plate, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 402(1) (McKinney 1970), or if a light is
out, id. § 375(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979), or if there is a crack in the windshield, id. § 375(22)
(McKinney 1970). Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that automobile stops of this type are an
"everyday occurrence." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976). Moreover, the
Prouse decision stated that arbitrarily stopping an automobile is unreasonable only as to the
driver, 440 U.S. at 663, thus leaving open the question of whether passengers may similarly
complain. In addition, the Prouse decision does not prevent the police from setting up a
roadblock, id. or from conducting "other not purely random stops (such as every 10th car to pass
a given point) that equate with, but are less intrusive than. a 100% roadblock stop." Id. at 664
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
174. See note 96 supra.
175. See notes 119-28 supra and accompanying text.
176. P. Chevigny, supra note 156, at 183 (police will "vary the facts in order to comply with
the legal rules"); J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in Democratic Society 215
(1967) (police officer "usually attempts to construct the appearance of compliance [with the law],
rather than allow the offender to escape apprehension"); Kaplan, supra note 9 at 1038 ("a
substantial percentage of policemen take the view that two wrongs make a right and that perjury
is a permissible method of avoiding the [exclusionary rule] sanction" (footnote omitted))
177. See generally Criminal Presumption Statute, supra note 144, at 189-92. In Thomas v.
State, 297 So. 2d 850, 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), the court stated that only when premises
are in the exclusive possession and control of a particular individual may knowledge of the
presence of contraband found therein and the ability to maintain control over it be inferred.
When premises are in joint possession, therefore, no such inference arises and knowledge of the
contraband's presence and the ability to maintain control over it must be established by proof. Id.
Based upon that rationale, the court reversed the conviction of the defendant, who was driving
an automobile owned by his passenger when it was stopped and searched by police; heroin and
cocaine were found in a bag on the floor between the passenger's legs. Id.; see State v. Fortes, 110
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an arrest with evidence sufficient to convict.
The chances for conviction are heightened when the defendant, lacking
automatic standing, attempts to establish standing at a preliminary hearing by
showing he had an expectation of privacy, or fourth amendment protection,
upon which the government intruded. Conviction of the guilty is a proper
societal goal. Nevertheless, following the suggestion of the Rakas Court that a
possessory interest will aid substantially in proving an expectation of pri-
vacy,1 7 8 even an innocent defendant may assert such an interest in his efforts
to obtain standing. 79 In so doing, however, he runs the grave risk that if
R-I. 406, 409-10, 293 A.2d 506, 508-09 (1972) (held insufficient evidence for conviction where
barbiturate pills were discovered on bucket seat occupied by defendant after he was ordered out of
the automobile by the police; there was no showing that defendant owned or operated the vehicle,
nor was there any testimony that he knew of, or exercised possession over, the illegal drugs); Reyes
v. State, 575 S.W.2d 38, 39-40 (Tex. Cr. App. 1979) (660 pounds of marijuana were discovered by
police in the back area of vehicle; despite the strong smell that led the police to conduct the
search, the court held defendant's status as a passenger, with no other evidence, was insufficient
to convict); Presswood v. State, 548 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Cr. App. 1977) (neither the driver nor
the passenger were convicted of possession of marijuana when the only evidence submitted was
that the drug was discovered in the glove compartment when they were present in the vehicle);
Harvey v. State, 487 S.V.2d 75, 78 (Tex. Cr. App. 1972) (mere fact that box containing marijuana
was discovered on the dashboard is insufficient evidence to support conviction of possession by
front seat passenger). In State v. Olsen, 113 R.I. 164, 319 A.2d 27 (1974), the court reversed the
defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana when the sole evidence was that he was
present in an automobile found to contain the drug. The court said that the state was required to
show that defendant was in conscious possession of, and exercised intentional control over, the
drug with knowledge of its nature. Id. at 166-67, 319 A.2d at 28-29; see Atkins v. State, 301 So.
2d 459, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (proof must not only be consistent with the guilt of the
accused, but also inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence); Commonwealth v.
Fortune, 456 Pa. 365, 369, 318 A.2d 327, 329 (1974) (conviction for illegal possession of narcotics
was not supported by mere evidence that drugs were found in plain view strewn on the kitchen
floor of a residence in which four other persons were present with the defendant). It is apparent
from the foregoing examples that courts in jurisdictions lacking presumption statutes, making
presence in an automobile where contraband is found sufficient evidence of possession by the
occupants, are reluctant to infer possession absent a clear showing of knowing dominion and
control. In fact, they find, as a matter of law, that such an inference may not be drawn, directly
contrary to the legal effect presumption statutes have in the jurisdictions that have adopted them.
See pt. 11 supra. It is doubtful whether similar results would be achieved where presumption
statutes are in force.
178. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978); see notes 163-68 supra and accompanying
text.
179. It is debatable, considering the evolution that the concept of standing is undergoing,
whether a possessory interest in the items seized would, alone, warrant standing. See note 49
supra. One court confessed that it "find[s] the concept of 'standing' totally incomprehensible and,
to the extent of overlap with Fourth Amendment rights, equally incapable of understanding."
Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Ky. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 519 (1979)
(No. 79-5146). This question is muddled further when the seized evidence is contraband. As the
Court said in Rakas, a legitimate expectation of privacy is not simply a subjective expectation of
privacy but, by definition, " 'one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable".' " 439 U.S.
at 143 n.12 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Therefore, the Rakas Court expressed consternation over a lower court holding, CoUon v. United
States, 371 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1967), which granted standing to object to the lawfulness of a
search of a stolen automobile to a person present therein at the time of the search. 439 U.S. at
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standing is denied or, even if granted, the motion to suppress is denied, this
admission of possession may later be used at trial for purposes of impeach-
ment. 180
A hypothetical illustrates the impending problem. Assume that the owner of
an automobile is driving with a friend. A police officer, acting merely on a
hunch, stops the vehicle and conducts a search. The search reveals a small
container of marijuana beneath the front seat and burnt marijuana cigarettes
in the ashtray, both of which the passenger was genuinely unaware. The
driver and passenger are arrested and charged with possession of a controlled
substance. 18 1 Pursuant to Rakas, the driver, as owner of the vehicle, is able to
establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. 18 2 There-
fore, he will be successful in suppressing the use of the marijuana as evidence
against him on the ground that the stop and search were not supported by
probable cause. 183 Lacking evidence, the prosecution will dismiss the charges
141 n.9. The Court reasoned that wrongful presence in an automobile could not give rise to a
privacy interest that society would accept as reasonable. Id. A similar argument can be made by
substituting the word "presence" for "possession." Certainly one in possession of contraband is,
by definition, in wrongful possession, and society ought not recognize that possession as sufficient
to claim a legitimate expectation of privacy. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would have
supported the Cotton decision if the defendant had claimed that his possessory interest in the
stolen vehicle, rather than his presence in that vehicle, was an adequate basis for standing.
180. See note 46 supra.
181. "An innocent passenger could only say he didn't know the [drugs were present], a
self-serving statement not likely to be persuasive with an officer who thought he had grounds for
an arrest." People v. Williams, 9 Cal. App. 3d 565, 568-69, 88 Cal. Rptr. 349, 351 (Ct. App.
1970).
182. It is debatable whether a driver who is not the owner of the automobile would be
granted standing to contest the search. Compare State v. Emery, 41 Or. App. 35, -, 597 P.2d
375, 376 (1979) (denied standing after noting that case was almost identical to Rakas except that
defendant was driver rather than passenger, a status that does not confer a greater expectation of
privacy) with United States v. Lopez, 474 F. Supp. 943, 946-47 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (granted
standing deriving support from Rakas concurrence which implied that control of the vehicle or
the keys may be sufficient interest to show an expectation of privacy).
183. Normally a warrant is needed to justify a search. B. Schwartz, supra note 12, § 7.20, at
288. In addition, the fourth amendment expressly states that a warrant will not issue without
probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. As a general rule, it judge or magistrate must decide the
question of whether there is sufficient probable cause to authorize a search. Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). Specifically, he must determine "'[ijf the facts and circum-
stances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that
[an] offense has been committed.' " Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925)
(quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813)). Searches conducted without
prior judicial approval "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). One exception is exigent circumstances which, if present, will
sustain a search solely on the judgment of the police officer on the issue of probable cause.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). The Supreme Court has long recognized the
"automobile exception" to the warrant requirement where exigency is premised on mobility.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Stopping an automobile without probable cause,
however, has recently been held to be a violation of the fourth amendment. Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). "[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute[s] a
'seizure' within the meaning of [the fourth and fourteenth) Amendments . . . ." Id. at 653. A
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against the driver.' 84 The passenger, however, is unable to show an expecta-
tion of privacy in the area searched, and, absent automatic standing, the
fruits of the bad faith search will be admissible against him at trial. SS
Considering the role of the presumption statute in proving a crime whose
central element is possession, it becomes incumbent on the defendant to take
the stand for his defense.18 6 As some commentators have contended, a
permissive presumption shifts the burden of persuasion. ' 8 7 It is beyond doubt
that the defendant's failure to take the stand on his own behalf will be
construed by the jury as an indication of guilt.' 88 If he takes the stand,
however, the defendant would be subject to impeachment if he made in-
criminating statements during his earlier effort to gain standing to contest the
search.' 89 Furthermore, his credibility may be attacked,1 90 and any prior
convictions he may have might be brought into evidence.1 9' The only
possibility of avoiding conviction at this point is for the defendant to convince
the jury of his innocence. The defendant, however, cannot simply say he was
a passenger; that is the precise person the statute was designed to impli-
cate.1 92 Nor may he merely protest that he did not know the illegal drugs
were in the vehicle; that is exactly the testimony the jury expects to hear
because of the defendant's strong motive to lie.'93 To prove innocence, he is
compelled to do more than just deny knowledge and possession of the
contraband.' 94 He can only assert, however, the truth-that he was simply
hunch is not sufficient probable cause and to permit the stopping of vehicles without probable
cause "is to open the door to stops on unsupported suspicion, or even on prejudice, the common
handmaiden of suspicion." People v. Singleton, 41 N.Y.2d 402, 409, 361 N.E.2d 1003, 1008, 393
N.Y.S.2d 353, 359 (1977) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
184. P. Chevigny, supra note 156, at 183; Allen, supra note 156, at 249.
185. Even at this stage, regardless of whether the defendant is convicted at trial, irreversible.
damage may have resulted. "Arrest, temporary incarceration, the posting of bond or the purchase
of bail bond, and the cost of defending oneself are undeniable hardships. Nor can we take lightly
the sense of human dignity which is all too often injured in the process." Ashford & Risinger,
supra note 68, at 191. Significantly, the admissibility of the crucial evidence may prompt the
defense attorney to persuade the defendant to plead guilty. J. Skolnick, supra note 176, at 223.
Therefore the exclusionary rule issue will never be addressed, a result that occurs in approxi-
mately 90% of the cases. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 1033.
186. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see notes 125-28
supra and accompanying text.
187. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 68, at 201.
188. 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 215, 221 (1968) (survey revealed that 71% of persons polled
believed defendant's failure to take the stand implied guilt; survey of attorneys showed that 94%
believed a jury would notice and infer guilt from defendant's silence).
189. See Fed. R. Evid. 613.
190. See id. 607, 608.
191. See id. 609; Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70
Yale L.J. 763, 775 (1961).
192. See notes 141-44 supra and accompanying text.
193. P. Chevigny, supra note 156, at 151.
194. See People v. Hargrove, 33 A.D.2d 539, 540, 304 N.Y.S.2d 574, 575 (1st Dep't 1969)
(conviction reversed because defendant was able to establish he was merely a hitchhiker); People v.
Anonymous, 65 Misc. 2d 288, 288-90, 317 N.Y.S.2d 237, 238-39 (Dist. Ct. 1970) (defendant was
able to establish that the narcotics found in the automobile he was driving were in fact
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riding in the automobile and that he was not aware of the drugs present
therein. The truth, however, may be insufficient to convince the jury of his
innocence. 195 The defendant's position is further eroded by the court's charge
to the jury that it may find the defendant guilty of possession solely because of
his presence in the automobile, surely an instruction that may sufficiently
relieve the jury of any lingering doubts it might have had about the defen-
dant's guilt. 196
It is ironic that in the above scenario the owner of the automobile, who was
in fact the possessor of the narcotics, need not even face trial because he was
able to acquire standing to contest the illegal search and suppress the use of
the contraband as evidence against him. The injustice is acute when it is
realized that the driver of the automobile is usually in possession of its
contents. This conclusion was implicitly recognized by the Rakas Court when
it indicated that owners have an expectation of privacy enabling them to
contest a search of their automobile. 197 If automatic standing is eliminated,
however, the innocent passenger will be at the mercy of the police officer
because he may not contest even a bad faith search,' 9 8 and he may have
prescription drugs that had spilled from his mother's purse at some earlier time); cf. Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 286 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (recognized defendant's
difficulty in provihg lack of knowledge).
195. "Presumptions of guilt are not lightly to be indulged from mere meetings." United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593 (1948). Nevertheless, "[i]t is not every one who can safely venture on
the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity,
nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character,
and offences charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to
increase rather than remove prejudices against him." Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66
- (1893).
196. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 68, at 201. The authors noted that "if only seven out
of ten persons who committed A and B also committed C, and if only seven out of ten persons
who have committed A and B, but who have not committed C, can successfully overcome the
presumption, then ...out of 100 prosecutions in which A and B are proved, there will be 79
convictions, nine of which will involve innocent persons. Here there is a wrongful conviction rate
of approximately 11.4%. Here the presumption should be held unconstitutional." Id. at 183
(footnote omitted). The presumption cases in question here fit neatly into this model. A is
defendant's presence in an automobile, B is the contraband's presence in the automobile, and C is
possession of the contraband by the defendant. Today, with the proliferation of illegally possessed
firearms and the widespread acceptance of drug use, even by non-users, see Rose, supra note 144,
at 767, it is likely that at least seven of ten persons who committed A and B are not guilty of C,
and if only seven of every ten who did not commit C are unable to rebut the presumption, the
presumption should be declared unconstitutional. The Supreme Court made it clear in Leary that
in determining whether a rational connection exists between the proved fact and the presumed
fact, courts should not confine themselves to the data that existed at the time of the presumption
statute's enactment but should readily consider more recent information to see if "the intervening
years have witnessed significant changes which might bear upon the presumption's validity."
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 38 (1969) (footnote omitted). At least one commentator has
suggested that such a reanalysis is in order. Rose, supra note 144, at 767-68.
197. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148-49 (1978).
198. Permitting a search of an automobile without probable cause would "leave law-abiding
citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949). Unfortunately "few prosecutors have shown any inclination to use their public powers
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insurmountable difficulties in proving his innocence at trial, particularly when
the prosecution has the advantage of a presumption statute that is designed to
establish his guilt.
B. The Proposed Solution
It is widely recognized that the Supreme Court views the exclusionary rule
with disfavor; 99 it is further contended that the Court has limited the scope
of fourth amendment protection, in essence by limiting standing, as a means
of curtailing the invocation of the exclusionary rule by criminal defendants.20 0
Even assuming that a defendant's own fourth amendment rights were vio-
lated, and that he therefore has standing, the Court may still not automat-
ically apply the exclusionary rule and suppress the evidence.
For example, the Court has held that the rule is not applicable in grand
jury proceedings, 2 0  nor can it be the basis for federal habeas corpus relief
when the state has provided the opportunity for a full and fair challenge of
the alleged fourth amendment violatiop.20 2 In addition, the Court has held
that the exclusionary rule will not be applied retroactively. °2 0 3 To achieve
these results, the Court has balanced competing interests. Specifically, the
public interest in finding the truth is weighed against the deterrent effect
excluding the evidence will have on future police misconduct.
204
This test is consistent with the primary purpose underlying the exclusionary
rule. Originally the rule furthered two goals: "to deter-to compel respect for
the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by remov-
ing the incentive to disregard it;"205 and to maintain the integrity of the
judicial process. °2 0 6 This second consideration has recently fallen into disre-
to control police abuses." P. Chevigny, supra note 156, at 250. Furthermore, judges are often
reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule because they are eager to believe the police- Kaplan,
supra note 186, at 1039. In small towns "the official bias is even more ironclad." P. Chevigny,
supra note 156, at 251-52.
199. Kaplan, supra note 9. at 1040; Knox, supra note 13, at 29. see note 16 supra, notes 28-31
supra and accompanying text.
200. Knox, supra note 13, at 29. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this to be its
position. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
201. United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)
202. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976),
203. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531. 534-35 (1975). Furthermore, illegally obtained
evidence may be used for purposes of impeaching the defendant's credibility when he testifies in
his defense at trial, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954), in deciding upon a sentence,
United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971), and
in parole revocation proceedings. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161,
1163 (2d Cir. 1970).
204. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 487-89 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531,
537-39 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-52 (1974); Walder v United States,
347 U.S. 62, 64-65 (1954).
205. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
206. Id. at 222. The rationale behind "the imperative of judicial integrity" is that -[clourts
which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the
constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
invasions." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 13 (1968); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U-S. 438,
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pute despite vigorous dissents. 20 7 The majority view is that a logical extension
of the doctrine of judicial integrity is in direct conflict with the precepts
espoused in Alderman v. United States, 208 namely, that only those persons
who have their own fourth amendment rights violated may object to an
unconstitutional search. 20 9 The argument advanced is that if judicial integrity
was the essential reason for excluding unconstitutionally seized evidence, the
courts would be required to suppress evidence regardless of whether the
defendant was vicariously asserting fourth amendment rights. 210 Hence, the
Court has concluded that although judicial integrity must always be consid-
ered, it is of "limited force as a justification for the exclusion of highly
probative evidence." '21 1
Despite the limits it has imposed on both the underlying purposes and the
scope of the exclusionary rule, the Court has faithfully maintained that
evidence gathered in violation of an individual's constitutional rights may not
be directly offered at trial to help secure a conviction. Nowhere is this more
vividly apparent than in the recent case of Brewer v. Williams. 21 2 In Brewer,
the defendant, a deeply religious former mental patient, had been arrested for
abducting a ten year old girl. He was to be transported by two police officers
a distance of 160 miles to stand trial. The defendant had been instructed by
his lawyer not to make any statements during the ride and the police officers
accompanying him had agreed not to question the defendant during the trip.
Although there was no direct interrogation, one of the officers, capitalizing on
the defendant's mental infirmities and religious convictions, successfully elic-
ited several incriminating statements from the defendant that ultimately led
the officers to the girl's body. 2 3 The Supreme Court held that the defendant
had been denied his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to counsel and
ruled that both the incriminating statements and the testimony that led the
police to the body were inadmissible as evidence. 21 4 The Brewer Court
was apparently compelled to comply with the idea that the Court "must take
care to enforce the Constitution without regard to the nature of the crime or
the nature of the criminal. 2
1 5
478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (implicitly overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 352-53 (1967)).
207. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 553 n.13 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
208. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
209. Id. at 171-72
210. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976).
211. Id. (footnote omitted). "The Court has declined to sacrifice society's interest on the altar
of judicial purity." Trager & Lobenfeld, supra note 5, at 452. With the concern for Judicial
integrity allayed, the exclusionary rule is primarily justified by its deterrent effect on police
conduct that violates fourth amendment rights. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
212. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
213. Id. at 390-93.
214. Id. at 406 & n.12. The exclusionary rule has traditionally been viewed as a remedy for
violations of the right to counsel. See note 18 supra.
215. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 248 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Abel, the
Court upheld the validity of a warrantless search by federal agents of petitioner's hotel room on
the ground that the room had been abandoned. The room was "abandoned" because petitioner
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Nevertheless, there is presently much debate as to whether the exclusionary
rule should receive per se application at trial once a defendant has established
that evidence was seized in violation of his rights.2 1 6 In fact, some courts
"often stretch and strain in serious cases to avoid applying the exclusionary
rule. '2 17 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, advocates recon-
sideration of whether, and to what extent, the exclusionary rule should be
retained, arguing that because adequate alternative remedies are now avail-
able for defendants that have had their constitutional rights violated,218 the
had been arrested earlier by federal authorities pursuant to an administrative warrant for
deportation. Id. at 218-19. This case is one example of the Court wavering from its firm
application of the exclusionary rule in suppressing "illegally" seized evidence at trial. It has been
suggested that the Court was strongly influenced by the fact that the case involved a Russian spy
being tried for conspiracy to commit espionage and that, had the circumstances been different, an
opposite result would have been reached. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 1037.
216. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 1041. Professor Kaplan argues that the rule should be
abandoned in the most serious cases, namely, treason, espionage, murder, armed robbery, and
kidnapping by organized groups. Id. at 1046. As a second proposal, he argues that the rule
should be inapplicable "where the police department in question has taken seriously its responsi-
bility to adhere to the fourth amendment." Id. at 1050. Professor Amsterdam contends that
legislation or police-made rules and regulations setting forth the boundaries of search and seizure
activity be drafted, and that they be subject to judicial review for reasonableness. If violated, the
exclusionary rule should apply. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L.
Rev. 349, 409-10 (1974). The American Law Institute advocates that the exclusionary rule not be
applied unless the violation is "substantial." The factors to be considered in determining whether
a particular violation is substantial include: "(a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct; (b)
the extent to which the violation was willful; (c) the extent to which privacy was invaded; (d) the
extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code; (e) whether, but for the
violation, the thing seized would have been discovered; and (f) the extent to which the violation
prejudiced the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to defend himself in the
proceeding in which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him." ALl
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § SS 290.2(4) (1975). Compare Mich. Const. art. I, §
11 (exempts narcotics and firearms "seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling
house" from scope of exclusionary rule) with People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 75, 290 P.2d 855
(1955) (rejects the idea that defendant must have standing to object to an unlawful search
and seizure). For a discussion of the exclusionary rule in foreign countries, see Symposium, The
Exclusionary Rule Under Foreign Law, 52 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 271 (1961).
217. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 1037 (footnote omitted).
218. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), the federal statute that confers a private cause of
action for redress of constitutional violations by state officials acting under color of authority, has
been suggested as a viable replacement for the exclusionary rule sanction. California v. Minjares,
100 S. Ct. 9, 14 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This statute has been construed to permit a
finding that not only the individual officer is liable, but also, under various circumstances, that
the municipal corporation that employs him may also be liable. Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that federal agents
may be sued for damages resulting from fourth amendment violations. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). In addition, many states have formulated
avenues of relief for state sponsored constitutional infringements. See California v. Minjares, 100
S. Ct. at 14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Another proposed substitution for the exclusionary rule is
a "tort remedy against the offending officer or his employer." Oaks, supra note 17, at 756.
Presumably, the various theories on which such an action could be brought would include
trespass, battery, assault, mental distress, and false imprisonment. But see Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The conclusion is inescapable that but one remedy
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rule is no longer necessary. 219
Reluctance over broadening the scope of the exclusionary rule, however,
necessarily involves two concerns. First, use of the exclusionary rule and
standing are inextricably bound together. The Court has noted that the value
of deterrence has "been considered sufficient to justify the suppression of
probative evidence even though the case against the defendant is weakened or
destroyed. '220 The Court, however, is not persuaded that any incremental
increase in the benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to defendants who
have not had their own constitutional rights violated "would justify further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime
and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth. ' ' 22' The Court, when adopting this view, was not indepen-
dently deciding whether the exclusionary rule applied in a specific case.
Rather, it was determining whether the defendants had standing to raise a
fourth amendment claim when they *themselves were not the victims of an
illegal search. The above language was reaffirmed in Rakas, a case that also
dealt with whether the defendants had standing.
222
In addition, when determining whether standing exists to raise a fourth
amendment claim, the Court should employ the same balancing test used in
determining whether the exclusionary rule should be applied in other situa-
tions. 223 The Court has explicitly recognized that "[tihe balancing process at
work in these cases [deciding whether illegally seized evidence must be
excluded in federal habeas corpus actions or whether such evidence may be
used to impeach credibility] also finds expression in the standing require-
ment. ' 224 Therefore, when faced with the issue of whether a particular class
of defendants should be granted standing and afforded the protection of the
exclusionary rule inherent therein, the Court must weigh the cost to society in
keeping relevant and reliable evidence from the trier of fact against the strong
desire to deter police misconduct.
225
The Court has apparently recognized the symbiotic relationship between
standing and the exclusionary rule. If the Supreme Court elects to abolish the
automatic standing rule, as its past holdings have suggested,2 2 6 it should also
recognize an exception for persons charged with illegal possession of con-
traband when a statute, which makes their presence in the automobile from
which the contraband was seized presumptive evidence of their guilt, is to be
exists to deter violations of the search and seizure clause. That is the rule which excludes illegally
obtained evidence."), overruled in part, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
219. California v. Minjares, 100 S. Ct. 9, 15 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice
Rehnquist is one of many who have expressed concern that " '[t]he criminal is to go free because
the constable has blundered."' Id. at 12 (quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N E. 585,
587 (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926)).
220. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
221. Id. at 175.
222. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
223. See notes 201-11 supra and accompanying text.
224. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976).
225. White & Greenspan, supra note 10, at 365.
226. See pts. I, III(A) supra and accompanying text.
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used against them at trial. Strict adherence to the Court's decisions compels
this result.
2 2 7
Many commentators agree that if police knowingly conduct an illegal
search against one party in the hopes of gaining evidence that will be
admissible against another party, the latter should be granted standing even
though his own fourth amendment rights were not violated. 22 Their rationale
is that to confer standing to those defendants is the only way to deter police
illegality in the first instance. This supports the view that when weighing the
costs to society of excluding evidence against the benefits of deterring police
misconduct, the scale tips sufficiently in favor of deterrence to warrant a grant
of standing so that the defendant may invoke the exclusionary rule.
When presumption statutes are included in the analysis, the scale tips so
heavily in support of retaining the exclusionary rule that the passengers must
not be denied standing to raise a fourth amendment claim. The reasoning
against retaining the remedy of exclusion is that usually the societal costs are
great because the evidence sought to be excluded is "relevant and reliable" 229
or "highly probative; '2 30 "often this evidence alone establishes beyond vir-
tually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 231 When the
evidence is contraband seized from the interior of an automobile in which the
defendant was merely a passenger, however, it does not establish the defen-
dant's guilt to such an absolute extent that its exclusion would substantially
infringe on the public interest of prosecuting and convicting those accused of a
crime. In fact, the statutes making presence in a vehicle in which contraband
is found presumptive evidence of possession were enacted specifically because
the evidence seized was usually not of sufficient quality to prove conclusively
defendant's guilt.
232
227. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), United States v Peltier, 422 US. 531 (1975);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
228. Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 434-38; Trager & Lobenfeld. supra note 5, at 456-57;
White & Greenspan, supra note 10, at 352-53 Professor Amsterdam goes one step further. He
argues that even if the stop is constitutional, as in the case of a nonrandom license-check stop, if
probable cause is lacking, any evidence discovered as a result of that stop should be excluded-
the potential for abuse in conducting such a stop on the mere suspicion that incriminating
evidence will be found is high and "far outweighs the need of the police to apprehend unlicensed
drivers." Amsterdam, supra note 216, at 436. He concludes by noting that not to permit exclusion
of evidence seized under these circumstances is to put - 'the liberty of every man in the hands of
every petty officer'." Id. at 438 (quoting James Otis, as reported in 2 L. Wroth & H.
Zobel-Legal Papers of John Adams 142 (1965)) (footnote omitted).
229. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
230. Stone v. Powell. 428 U.S. 465. 485 (1976).
231. Kaufman v. United States. 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969). "The test, in short, is the reliability
of the evidence." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 425 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting The
Supreme Court has noted that the exclusionary rule encroaches on the public interest by
excluding evidence bearing on the truth which would aid in gaining convictions or acquittals.
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 G969). It is absurd to think that a criminal
defendant would seek to exclude evidence that would help acquit




When deterrence of police illegality is virtually nonexistent, as when
passengers of an automobile do not have standing to contest a search of the
vehicle in which they rode, and when the evidence seized is relevant at best but
certainly not absolute evidence of guilt, the exclusionary rule becomes a
necessary and important tool in the field of criminal justice.
Given the premise that the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful
police conduct, the doctrine of standing can only be justified as a vehicle for
preventing the operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the point of diminishing
returns. Thus, the ideal rule of standing will function to exclude evidence from
criminal trials only when the social value of the additional amount of deterrence
gained outweighs the cost of excluding relevant evidence.233
More significantly, the exclusionary rule plays a vital role in the protection of
all persons' constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The automatic standing rule provides the only opportunity for innocent
passengers implicated in possessory crimes by presumption statutes to vindi-
cate their rights and avoid unjust conviction. Therefore, when considering
whether the automatic standing rule deserves preservation, the Supreme
Court must feel compelled to recognize the necessity for that rule's continued
life for those defendants who are charged with possessory crimes pursuant to
statutes that permit one to infer their guilt from presence alone.
Robert A. Gaynor
233. White & Greenspan, supra note 10, at 365.
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